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INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the global financial crisis, executive
compensation is front page news.' The soaring rhetoric about
excessive pay to ungrateful bank employees, coupled with personal
attacks on CEOs and other executives, reveals a strong public anger
toward the highly paid employees of public companies. In the United
States, for example, revelation of bonus payments at Merill Lynch and
AIG provoked the ire of the general public and politicians alike.2 In
Australia in 2008 the then-Prime Minister described the financial
crisis as a consequence of "extreme capitalism," characterized by
"[o]bscene failures in corporate governance which rewarded greed
without any regard to the integrity of the financial system."
3
Frequently missing from the discussion, however, are basic facts
surrounding the terms and conditions of the executives' relationships
with their firms, especially the companies' ex ante contractual
obligations to their executives. While several recent studies in the
United States have begun to fill in some of the details surrounding
American executive employment contracts, or the lack thereof,4 none
has fully captured the U.S. experience, especially from a legal
perspective. Likewise, none of these studies even touches on
Australian CEOs' contractual employment relationships.
1. See, e.g., Joanna Chung, U.S. Banks Told to Reveal Executive Pay, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 29,
2008, at 6 (discussing Congress' direction to nine U.S. financial firms to turn over executive
compensation data); Michael R. Crittenden, House Passes Bill to Curb Executive Pay, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 1, 2009, at A4 (discussing new legislation that aims to curb executive compensation);
Jane Croft et al., Banks Will Accept Curbs on Lending and Pay, Says PM, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 9,
2008, at 4 (discussing banks' acceptance of government curbs on executive compensation);
Stephen Labaton, Obama Seeks to Increase Oversight of Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,
2009, at Al (discussing President Obama's reaction to excessive executive pay).
2. See, e.g., Serena Ng, Officials Blast AIG Bonuses: 'Outrageous' Say Geithner and
Feinberg, But Management is Given a Pass, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2010, at C3 (discussing Treasury
officials' reaction to AIG bonus payments); Kara Scannell et al., Judge Tosses Out Bonus Deal:
SEC Pact with BofA Over Merrill Is Slammed; New York Weighs Charges Against Lewis, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 15, 2009, at Al (discussing a federal judge's denouncement of the SEC's pact with
Bank of America).
3. Lawrence Bartlett, Global Crisis Tailure of Extreme Capitalism: Australian PM,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 15, 2008, available at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/
news/international-business/Global-crisis-failure-of-extreme-capitalism-Australian-
PMlarticleshow/3597656.cms.
4. See infra Part II for a review of the recent literature.
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The regulatory regimes of the United States and Australia
enjoy many comparable features. Indeed, in 2008 the U.S Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") selected Australia as the pilot
jurisdiction for a trial mutual recognition program, 5 which was based
on a "comparability assessment" of each country's regulatory system.
6
There are, however, interesting differences between the two
jurisdictions in terms of capital market and regulatory structures. For
example, capital markets in Australia differ markedly from the classic
U.S. dispersed model of share ownership.7 Although Australia is often
assumed to have a pattern of diffuse shareholding, empirical studies
show that this is not the case. Such studies demonstrate that, in
addition to high levels of institutional investment, Australia's listed
corporate sector contains a significant proportion of controlling
blockholder ownership.8
Debate has raged in the United States on the issue of whether
executive compensation is efficient and determined at arm's length, or
skewed because of a power imbalance between managers and
shareholders.9 A comparative analysis of the kind undertaken in this
5. Mutual Recognition Arrangement Between the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Together with the
Australian Minister for Superannuation and Corporate Law (Aug. 25, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia-mututal-recognitionaustralia/framework-arrangement.
pdf. For a discussion of the relationship between globalization and the strategy of mutual
recognition, see James D. Cox, Coping in the Global Marketplace: Survival Strategies for a 75-
Year-Old SEC, 95 VA. L. REV. 941, 943-46 (2009); Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A
Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 31 (2007).
6. Press Release, SEC, SEC Chairman Cox, Prime Minister Rudd Meet Amid U.S.-
Australian Mutual Recognition Talks (March 29, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2008/2008-52.htm.
7. Note, however, that the traditional image of the United States as a dispersed
shareholder jurisdiction has been challenged in recent times. See Clifford G. Holderness, The
Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1377 (2009) (providing
evidence of significant concentration of ownership in U.S. firms).
8. See, e.g., Geofrey P. Stapledon, Share Ownership and Control in Listed Australian
Companies, 2 CORP. GOVERNANCE INT'L 17 (1999) (showing almost half of Australian listed
companies had a non-institutional shareholder with a stake of twenty percent or more); see also
Asjeet S. Lamba & Geofrey P. Stapledon, The Determinants of Corporate Ownership Structure:
Australian Evidence (Univ. of Melbourne Pub. Law Research Paper, No. 20, 2001) (discussing
ownership structure among publicly listed Australian companies), available at http:/papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=279015. For recent patterns of Australian share
ownership, see AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES EXCHANGE (ASX), 2008 AUSTRALIAN SHARE OWNERSHIP
STUDY (2009); Grant Fleming et al., Agency Costs and Ownership Structure in Australia, 13
PAC.-BASIN FIN. J. 29 (2005).
9. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD
REV. ECON. POL'Y 283 (2005) (discussing the growth of U.S. executive pay, and comparing the
arm's length bargaining model and the managerial power model as possible explanations for this
escalation); John E. Core, Wayne Guay & Randall Thomas, Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient
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Article provides an additional perspective on the optimal contracting
and managerial power models of executive pay in U.S. academic
literature. 10 Simply stated, even if one accepts that a particular model
has greater explanatory power in the U.S. context, this will not
necessarily be the case in other jurisdictions, such as Australia.
In this Article, we are the first to compile, compare, and
statistically analyze CEO employment contracts for both U.S. and
Australian CEOs." We find that there are many statistically
significant differences between the provisions of these agreements.
Some of these reflect underlying differences in the legal and
regulatory environment, while others are not so easily explained. For
instance, many more American CEOs have change-in-control
provisions in their employment agreements than Australian CEOs,
but this difference may well stem from the more stringent stock
exchange listing requirements of the Australian Securities Exchange
("ASX"). Vast differences in the use of arbitration provisions cannot be
explained so easily by legal rules, but may instead reflect cultural
differences in that arbitration has historically been employed in
Australia as a dispute resolution device in labor union relations with
employers.
We begin with a brief comparative overview of the regulatory
frameworks for executive pay in the two countries. We also consider
regulatory responses to the issue of executive compensation arising
from the Enron scandal and, more recently, the global financial crisis.
We then review the existing empirical studies in the United States of
various contracts between the American CEO and his or her firm.
Next, we lay out our empirical analysis, beginning with a detailed
description of our data and finishing with our multivariate regression
analysis. We conclude with some brief remarks about the implications
of our findings.
Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142 (2005) (assessing the claim under managerial
power theory that corruption in the pay-setting process results in inefficient CEO compensation);
Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board
Capture, Optimal Contracting and Officers' Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 846,
857-64 (2011) (discussing the evolution of managerial power/board capture theory).
10. See Thomas & Wells, supra note 9 (discussing the evolution of managerial
power/board capture theory).
11. For an interesting analysis of the characteristics of the modern chief executive officer,
see Marianne Bertrand, CEOs, 1 ANN. REV. ECON. 121 (2009).
562 [Vol. 64:2:559
HeinOnline  -- 64 Vand. L. Rev. 562 2011
2011] CEO EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT PROVISIONS
I. THE REGULATORY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK FOR
EXECUTIVE PAY IN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA
Historically, both the United States and Australia have tended
to allow market mechanisms to operate on executive pay with limited
legislative intervention. 2 In spite of this basic approach, however, a
range of regulatory constraints now affect executive compensation in
both jurisdictions.1 3 Australia has a "twin peaks" model of financial
regulation, which the U.S. Department of the Treasury proposed as a
possible model for the United States in 2008.14 Under the Australian
model, one regulator, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
("APRA"), is responsible for prudential regulation of financial
institutions, and another distinct regulatory authority, the Australian
Securities and Investments Commission ("ASIC"), is responsible for
business conduct and consumer protection.
Traditionally, Australian courts, following U.K. precedent,
have been reluctant to scrutinize the level of director and executive
remuneration to determine whether it is excessive, 15 and there has
been a paucity of case law on this issue. 16 Nonetheless, an expanding
array of controls relating to executive pay now exists in Australia
under a complex mix of "black letter" law and principles-based "soft"
law. 17
12. See generally Kym Sheehan, The Regulatory Framework for Executive Remuneration in
Australia, 31 SYDNEY L. REV. 273 (2009) (proposing a framework for analyzing the regulation of
executive pay in Australia).
13. For an overview of the regulatory framework relating to executive compensation in
Australia, see generally AUSTRALIAN GOV'T PRODUCTIVITY COMM'N, INQUIRY REPORT No. 49,
EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION IN AUSTRALIA, ch. 5 (2009) [hereinafter AGPC REMUNERATION
REPORT], available at http://www.pc.gov.au_ data/assets/pdfLfile/0008/93590/executive-
remuneration-report.pdf (reporting on the Australian regulatory framework for executive
remuneration); Sheehan, supra note 12.
14. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY
STRUCTURE 3, 13-14, 143 (2008).
15. Re Halt Garage (1964) Ltd., [1982] 3 All E.R. 1016 (Eng.); cf. id. at 1042 (illustrating a
different outcome if the payments cannot be characterized as remuneration, but are simply
gratuitous distributions).
16. For example, the U.K case Guinness p.l.c. v. Saunders, [1990] 2 A.C. 663, concerned not
the issue of whether remuneration of £5.2 million paid to a former non-executive director for
services in connection with a takeover was reasonable, but whether the committee purporting to
contract on the company's behalf had authority to do so. The court held that no such authority
existed.
17. See Julia Black, Forms and Paradoxes of Principles-Based Regulation, 3 CAPITAL
MARKETS L.J. 425, 426 (2008) (outlining the perceived benefits and downsides of principles-based
regulation over rules-based regulation); Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the
Rhetoric of 'Principles-Based Systems' in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation and Accounting,
60 VAND. L. REV. 1411, 1426-35 (2007) (criticizing the characterization of entire legal systems as
either rules-based or principles-based).
563
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The first of these legal controls is the Australian Corporations
Act 2001 ("Corporations Act"), which is the principal statutory basis
for corporate regulation in Australia.18  Many sections of the
Corporations Act are relevant to executive compensation, including
general corporate governance provisions concerning the duties of
directors and rights of shareholders, and specific provisions
concerning, for example, remuneration of officers and termination
payments. Secondly, Australian-listed companies are bound by the
ASX Listing Rules, which include a number of executive pay-related
requirements. 19 Thirdly, Australian financial institutions are now
subject to prudential guidelines on executive remuneration
promulgated by APRA. 20
In addition to these constraints, soft law exists in the form of
the ASX Corporate Governance Council corporate governance
principles and recommendations ("ASX corporate governance
principles"). 21 These ASX principles operate on a flexible "comply or
explain," or "if not, why not" basis.22 Other examples of soft law
include some influential industry-based codes on corporate governance
and executive remuneration, 23  including guidelines issued by
18. Although Australia technically has a state-based system of corporations law, the
Corporations Act is federal legislation, as a result of a referral by each state of its powers
relating to corporations to the federal government. See COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL.,
CORPORATIONS AGREEMENT 2002 AS AMENDED (2006). This broad referral of powers was an
attempt to unify and harmonize corporate law rules in Australia. Whereas state competition has
been viewed as a valuable contributor to efficiency in U.S. corporate law, in the Australian
context, it was considered to have the opposite effect.
19. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 793A (Austl.).
20. See, e.g., APRA, PRUDENTIAL PRACTICE GUIDE 511: REMUNERATION (2009), available at
http://www.apra.gov.au/Policy/upload/AI-PPG511_REM-112009_ex.pdf (guiding institutions in
managing risks that arise from remuneration agreements).
21. ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter ASX CGC 2007]. The ASX corporate governance
principles were first introduced in 2003. See ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL,
PRINCIPLES OF GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BEST PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS (1st ed.
2003) [hereinafter ASX CGC 2003]. The principles have been the subject of ongoing assessment
and consultation since that time, and the revised second edition, which included a change in
title, was released in 2007. At the time of the introduction of the ASX corporate governance
principles, the Managing Director and CEO of the ASX stated that "[t]hrough a disclosure based
approach, the ASX is keen to avoid a U.S. style Sarbanes-Oxley legislative solution." Richard
Humphry, Manging Director and CEO, Austl. Stock Exch., Address to the Austl. Inst. of Co. Dirs.
Forum: "If Not, Why Not?" (Apr. 2, 2003).
22. The "if not, why not" approach requires listed companies to disclose deviations from the
principles under ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3. See ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL,
RESPONSE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW GROUP REPORT (2004); Humphry, supra note 21.
23. See generally AGPC REMUNERATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 126-27 (discussing the
Australian regulatory framework for executive remuneration); Sheehan, supra note 12, 283-85
(proposing a framework for analyzing the regulation of executive pay in Australia).
564
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institutional investor organizations, 24 proxy advisers, 25 and business
groups.26
In Australia, unlike in the United States, there is no
requirement to disclose full CEO contracts. There are, however, a
number of provisions affecting disclosure of information about
executive pay. Section 300A of the Corporations Act, for example,
requires listed companies to disclose specified information concerning
the compensation of key management personnel in a dedicated section
of the annual directors' report: the remuneration report.27 These
disclosure requirements were strengthened in the 2004 post-Enron
reforms28 to address concerns that executive pay in Australian-listed
companies was insufficiently linked to performance 29 and that the
disclosure regime was inadequate. 30
24. See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL OF SUPER INVESTORS ("ACSr'), A GUIDE FOR
SUPERANNUATION TRUSTEES ON THE CONSIDERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL & CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE RISKS IN LISTED COMPANIES (2009); ACSI, GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES: A GUIDE FOR
SUPERANNUATION TRUSTEES TO MONITOR LISTED AUSTRALIAN COMPANIES (2009); INVESTMENT
AND FINANCIAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION ("IFSA'), GUIDANCE NOTE No. 2.00, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: A GUIDE FOR FUND MANAGERS AND CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 2004); IFSA,
GUIDANCE NOTE CIRCULAR, NON-BINDING SHAREHOLDER VOTE ON REMUNERATION REPORTS
(2005); IFSA, GUIDANCE NOTE No. 12.00, EXECUTIVE EQUITY PLAN GUIDELINES (2007).
25. See, e.g., RISKMETRICS GROUP (AUSTL.) PTY LTD, ASSESSING REMUNERATION REPORTS
FOR ASX-LISTED COMPANIES (2008) (advising institutional investors on remunerations risks).
26. See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN INST. OF Co. DIRS. ("AICD"), EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION:
GUIDELINES FOR LISTED COMPANY BOARDS (2009) (articulating a set of guidelines to assist public
company boards in the design and negotiation of CEO remuneration arrangements).
27. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 300A (Austl.).
28. Changes under the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and
Corporate Disclosure) Act ("CLERP 9 Act") in this regard included, for example, broadening the
scope of section 300A of the Corporations Act to encompass disclosure of group managers' pay,
and to require more detailed information concerning the link between pay and corporate
performance. CLERP 9 Act 2004 (Cth) (Austl.). See generally RICHARD ALCOCK & CARL BICEGO,
CLERP 9 AND EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION (2003), available at http://www.findlaw.
com.aularticles/326/clerp-9-and-executive-remuneration.aspx; BLAKE DAWSON WALDRON
LAWYERS, THE BDW GUIDE TO CLERP 9 2, 7-9 (2004), available at http://www.eqt.com.
aulpdf_files/clerp9guide.pdf.
29. See Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure)
Bill 2003 (Cth) (Austl.) (raising concern that executive pay is not sufficiently linked to company
performance).
30. The disclosure regime had been the subject of a major overhaul in 1998. For analysis of
the pre-1998 disclosure regime for director and executive compensation, see Jennifer G. Hill,
What Reward Have Ye? Disclosure of Director and Executive Remuneration in Australia, 14
COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 232 (1996); Michael Quinn, The Unchangeables-Director and Executive
Remuneration Disclosure in Australia, 10 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 89 (1999). For discussion of some of
the defects in Australia's pre-2004 disclosure regime for executive compensation, see Quinn,
supra.
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Section 300A of the Corporations Act is augmented by Principle
8 of the ASX corporate governance principles 31 and accounting
standard requirements. 32 There is a strong focus on the correlation
between performance and executive compensation in these disclosure
provisions.33  Another regulation, however, section 211 of the
Corporations Act, provides that remuneration to officers is prima facie
prohibited, unless it is "reasonable" or approved by shareholders. 34
Although this section could potentially require the courts to scrutinize
levels of executive compensation, there have been few cases to date.3 5
A significant proportion of Australia's regulatory framework for
executive compensation, including the introduction of the ASX
corporate governance principles in 200336 and important reforms to
the Corporations Act in 2004,3 7 constitutes a direct response to Enron
and some contemporaneous Australian corporate scandals.38 One of
the most controversial of these reforms was the introduction of section
250R(2) of the Corporations Act. 39  This provision requires
31. ASX CGC 2007, supra note 21, principle 8. See generally David Ablen, Remunerating
'Fairly and Responsibly' The Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice
Recommendations of the ASX Corporate Governance Council, 25 SYDNEY L. REV. 555 (2003)
(examining ASX's principles in relation to executive remuneration).
32. AUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. ("AASB'), STANDARD 124, RELATED PARTY
DISCLOSURES (2009); see also AASB, STANDARD 119, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS (2010) (discussing
accounting standards for employee benefits).
33. See Andreas Schoenemann, Executive Remuneration in New Zealand and Australia. Do
Current Laws, Regulations and Guidelines Ensure "Pay for Performance" ?, 37 VICTORIA U.
WELLINGTON L. REV. 31 (2006) (examining the extent to which Australian and New Zealand law
ensure "pay for performance").
34. See generally Andrew Defina et al., What Is Reasonable Remuneration for Corporate
Officers? An Empirical Investigation into the Relationship Between Pay and Performance in the
Largest Australian Companies, 12 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 341 (1994) (examining what is
reasonable remuneration).
35. The issue of whether remuneration was reasonable was, however, addressed in Forge v
ASIC (2004) 213 ALR 574 (Austl.). See also Dome Res. NL v Silver (2008) 72 NSWLR 693
(Austl.) (discussing section 211 of the Corporations Act, but not directly dealing with the concept
of reasonableness); Mott v Mount Edon Goldmines (Aust.) Ltd. (1994) 12 ACSR 658 (briefly
contemplating whether the issue of options would be a remuneration under section 243K, the
predecessor to section 211 of the Corporations Act, but not deciding the issue).
36. ASX CGC 2003, supra note 21, at 11.
37. The main Australian legislative response to Enron and analogous Australian corporate
collapses was the CLERP 9 Act, which amended the Corporations Act. See Jennifer G. Hill,
Regulatory Responses to Global Corporate Scandals, 23 WIS. INT'L L.J. 367, 374 (2005) (briefly
discussing the main features of the Act).
38. See generally id. ("Just as SOX directly responded to specific issues relating to the
collapse of Enron, the 2004 CLERP 9 Act bears many hallmarks of the HIH collapse and
subsequent Royal Commission.'); Sheehan, supra note 12, at 275-76 (discussing some of the
objectives of the response).
39. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 250R(2) (Austl.) (requiring a resolution to adopt the
remuneration report to be put to a non-binding vote at the annual general meeting); see also
566
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shareholders of an Australian-listed company to pass an annual non-
binding vote indicating whether they adopt the directors'
remuneration report. 40 The explicit goals of this provision are to
provide shareholders with greater voice concerning remuneration
issues41 and to encourage more consultation and information flow
concerning compensation policies between directors and
shareholders. 42 It is also worth noting that under the Corporations
Act, shareholders in Australian public companies possess considerably
stronger rights than their U.S. counterparts in a range of corporate
governance scenarios, such as initiating alterations to the
constitution, convening company meetings, and appointing and
removing directors to and from office.
43
Several ASX Listing Rules affect executive compensation, and
they often employ shareholder consent as a regulatory device. 44 Rule
10.14, for example, requires shareholder consent for the issue of
securities to directors under an employee incentive scheme. 45 Rule
10.18 prohibits a senior executive from receiving termination benefits
due to a change in control of the company; however, in practice, it is
possible to draft around this proscription to avoid characterization of
id. s 249L(2) (requiring notice that the resolution on remuneration report will be put at the
annual general meeting); id. s 300A (specifying the information regarding remuneration required
in the directors' report of a listed company). Section 250R(2) was based upon an analogous U.K.
provision introduced in 2002, which is now found in section 439 of the U.K. Companies Act of
2006. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 439.
40. See generally Larelle Chapple & Blake Christensen, The Non-binding Vote on Executive
Pay: A Review of the CLERP 9 Reform, 18 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 263, 263-66 (2005) (evaluating the
motivations and the effectiveness of the provision).
41. Explanatory Memorandum, Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform
and Corporate Disclosure) Bill 2003 (Cth) 5.434-35 (Austl.).
42. Id. 4.353, 5.413.
43. For a detailed comparison of shareholder rights in these areas under U.S. and
Australian corporate law, see Jennifer G. Hill, Subverting Shareholder Rights: Lessons from
News Corp.'s Migration to Delaware, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2010); Jennifer G. Hill, The Rising
Tension Between Shareholder and Director Power in the Common Law World, 18 CORP.
GOVERNANCE: INT'L REV. 344 (2010) [hereinafter Hill, Rising Tension].
44. For a list of all ASX Listing Rules affecting executive compensation, including those
requiring shareholder approval, see AGPC REMUNERATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 132.
45. ASX, ASX LISTING RULES, r. 10.14, at 1008 (2010)[hereinafter LISTING RULES]. It has
been reported that a number of protest votes against the directors' remuneration report were
recorded at companies using exemptions or ASX waivers to avoid the need for shareholder
consent under this listing rule. See Stuart Washington, How Executive Rewards Woke a
Slumbering Giant, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Nov. 12, 2007, at 19 (noting "that many large
votes against pay deals are associated with companies willing to use exemptions available under
listing rule 10.14 and ASX waivers to enshrine executives' pay deals without seeking shareholder
approval, as is the current requirement").
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certain payments as "termination benefits."46 Another important
listing rule, Rule 3.1, embodies Australia's continuous disclosure
regime for listed companies. 47 The continuous disclosure regime48 is
particularly strict by international standards. It requires a corporate
entity, on becoming aware of information that a reasonable person
would expect to have a material effect on its securities, to immediately
inform the ASX.49 In 2003, the ASX stated that it expected companies
announcing the appointment of a new CEO to disclose a summary of
the key terms and conditions of the relevant employment contract to
the ASX in compliance with the continuous disclosure regime.50
Finally, soft law found, for example, in Principle 8 of the ASX
corporate governance principles I  and various business group
guidelines, addresses the structure of executive pay and the process by
which it is determined. Recently announced amendments to the ASX
corporate governance principles will strengthen provisions relating to
remuneration committees and their composition and the obligations to
report departures from the standards. 52 Also, in a shift from soft to
hard law, new changes to the ASX Listing Rules introduce a
mandatory requirement for ASX 300 companies to have a
remuneration committee, comprised exclusively of non-executive
directors.53
46. LISTING RULES, r. 10.18. 'Termination benefits" are defined in Chapter 19 of the ASX
Listing Rules as "payments, property and advantages that are receivable on termination of
employment, engagement or office, except those from any superannuation or provident fund and
those required by law to be made." Id. at 1,925.
47. Id. r. 3.1, at 302. For background to Australia's continuous disclosure regime, which was
introduced in 1994, see Mark Blair, Australia's Continuous Disclosure Regime: Proposals for
Change, 2 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 54 (1992); Peta Spender, The Legal Relationship Between the
Australian Stock Exchange and Listed Companies, 13 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 240, 268-74 (1995).
48. The continuous disclosure regime receives statutory backing under section 674 of the
Corporations Act. Corporations Act 2001 s 674 (Austl.).
49. LISTING RULES, supra note 45, r. 3.1, at 302. In spite of the apparent breadth of the
continuous disclosure requirement, Rule 3.1 contains important exemptions or carve-outs from
the general obligation to disclose material information. Id. r. 3.1, at 302-03.
50. See ASX, COMPANIES UPDATE NO. 03-03, CONTINUOUS DISCLOSURE AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER REMUNERATION 1-2 (2003); see also ASX CGC 2003, supra note 21, principle
9, at 51-57.
51. See ASX CGC 2007, supra note 21, at 35-37.
52. For a discussion of the new rule, see Media Release, ASX, Changes to Corporate
Governance Principles and Recommendations (June 30, 2010); see also ASX, MARKED UP
AMENDMENTS DATED 30 JUNE 2010 TO THE SECOND EDITION AUGUST 2007 OF THE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 16 (2010), available at http://www.asx.
net.aulaboutlpdfcg-marked upamendments_30junel0.pdf (marking-up the amendments to
Recommendation 8.2).
53. The ASX 300 comprises the 300 largest listed companies on the Australian Securities
Exchange. See ASX, LISTING RULE AMENDMENTS - NEW REQUIREMENTS FOR A REMUNERATION
COMMITTEE AND A COMPANY TRADING POLICY 8 (2010) ("An entity which was included in the S &
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The Australian Institute of Company Directors ("AICD")
Guidelines on Executive Pay54 constitute another example of soft law.
These guidelines focus on the process for determining executive
remuneration, 55 and the terms and structure of executive contracts
and compensation packages. 56 For example, the AICD guidelines
distinguish between three possible types of employment contract: pure
fixed-term, maximum-term, and indefinite-term contracts. 57 They
recommend against adoption of pure fixed-term CEO contracts, which
can only be terminated for misconduct, in view of the logistical
difficulties and costs of early termination by the board. 58
Several other areas of Australian law outside corporate law are
also relevant to executive remuneration. The first of these relates to
pension or superannuation funding for retirement income. The three
pillars of retirement funding59  in Australia are voluntary
superannuation and private savings, compulsory superannuation, and
the taxpayer funded age pension.60 A radical change in the picture of
Australian superannuation occurred in 1992 with the introduction of
superannuation guarantee legislation,6 1 which made occupational
employer funded superannuation compulsory for the first time.62 This
P / ASX 300 Index at the beginning of its financial year must have a remuneration committee for
the entire duration of that financial year.").
54. AICD, supra note 26.
55. Id. at 9-15.
56. Id. at 16-25. In addition, the guidelines discuss "[rieviewing arrangements," id. at 26-
28, and "[o]ther matters," id. at 29-32, such as the need to gauge public sentiment concerning
executive remuneration, id. at 30, and consider whether remuneration packages are publicly
defendable and affect corporate reputation, id. at 29, 31.
57. Id. at 20.
58. Id.
59. See generally Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A
Comparative Perspective, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 7-10 (1991) (discussing the growth of institutional
investment funds in various countries).
60. For an overview of Australia's superannuation system, see SUPER SYSTEM REVIEW,
FINAL REPORT PART ONE: OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS app. B, at 69 (2010) [hereinafter
COOPER REVIEW], available at http://www.supersystemreview.gov.au/content/downloads/final-
report/part one/Final_ReportPart_1_Consolidated.pdf. The Cooper Review constitutes a major
recent appraisal of the operation Australia's superannuation system.
61. Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth) (Austl.).
62. The level of compulsory employer funded superannuation guarantee contributions was
targeted to rise gradually from an initial rate of three percent to nine percent by the year 2000.
See generally Jennifer Hill, Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance in Australia, in
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 583, 588-89 (Theodor Baums et al.
eds., 1993). Current reforms under the Australian government's Stronger and Fairer
Superannuation System Reforms will raise the superannuation guarantee further to twelve
percent. See Chris Bowen, Minister for Fin. Servs., Superannuation & Corporate Law, Remarks
on a Stronger and Fairer Superannuation System, (May 26, 2010) available at http://treasurer
.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=speeches/200/009.htm&pageID=O5&min=ceba&Year=&DocTyp
e=1.
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legislation was described as "perhaps unique by world standards.., a
curious combination of compulsory but private sector located
funding."63 Since the introduction of this retirement funding system in
Australia, superannuation savings have risen steeply to a current
level of over one trillion dollars.64 The employers of eighty-eight
percent of all Australian workers, including executives, are now
required to make superannuation contributions to a scheme on their
employees' behalf.65 Superannuation is therefore a significant and
valuable component of pay in Australia.
The second intersecting legal field is labor law. One doctrine in
particular, the unfair contracts jurisdiction under state labor law,
proved relevant to executive remuneration and created an exception to
the general dearth of litigation in this area. The unfair contracts
jurisdiction is contained in section 106 of the Industrial Relations Act
1996 of New South Wales ("N.S.W."). 66 Although originally intended to
provide protection for vulnerable and low-paid workers,67 by the
beginning of this decade the provision had come to be described as a
"corporate executive cornucopia."68 Many of the largest awards to
executives under section 106 related to loss of performance bonuses
and share options under incentive-based compensation schemes. 69
63. Hill, supra note 62, at 589 (citing evidence provided by a representative of the
Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia to the Senate Select Committee on
Superannuation).
64. This is predicted to grow to $6.1 trillion by 2035. See COOPER REVIEW, supra note 60, at
5.
65. Id. at 71 (citing the findings of Australian Bureau of Statistics); see also AUSTL. BUREAu
OF STATISTICS, EMPLOYEE EARNINGS, BENEFITS AND TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP 3 (2010),
available at http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/subscriber.nsf/O/C6C93BF656DB4C6CA25
7720001D7CE2/$File/63100_august%202009.pdf. In the words of the Cooper Review,
"Australians have contributions made to their super funds whether they like it or not." COOPER
REVIEW, supra note 60, at 1.
66. For an overview of the operation of section 106 and its initial availability to high income
earners, see Joellen Riley, Unfair Contracts Review: Unfair Favouritism for High Flyers? A
Review of the Proposal to Amend § 106 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW), 16 COM. L. Q.
15, 16-17 (2002).
67. See JEFFREY PHILLIPS & MICHAEL TOOMA, THE LAW OF UNFAIR CONTRACTS IN NSW: AN
EXAMINATION OF SECTION 106 OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT 1996 (NSW) 1 (2004) (noting
that the unfair contracts jurisdiction was introduced in order to "safeguard the terms and
conditions of milk vendors, bread carters[,] and contract labour, particularly in the construction
industry").
68. See Riley, supra note 66, at 15 (citing former Attorney General of New South Wales, Jeff
Shaw QC, in Westfield Holdings v Adams [2001] NSWIRComm 293 55 (Austl.) (decided Dec.
21, 2001).
69. See generally PHILLIPS & TOOMA, supra note 67, 1 3.05-100 (discussing the application
of section 106 to incentive schemes such as commission schemes, bonus schemes, and share
option plans).
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Emblematic of such cases is Canizales v Microsoft Corp.,70 where the
Industrial Relations Commission of N.S.W. awarded A$14 million to a
former Microsoft executive, who was retrenched two months prior to
the vesting date of a valuable tranche of stock options.71 By 2006,
however, this avenue of redress for executives had been severely
curtailed, firstly by state legislation responding directly to the
Canizales decision 72 and subsequently by broad federal workplace
relations reforms.73
Finally, taxation laws have been important in shaping the
contours of executive salary packages in Australia.74 Historically,
certain components of salary packages received concessional tax
treatment. 75 Concessions applied, for example, to fringe benefits or
perks, superannuation, and employee share schemes. The tax
narrative has, however, been one in which the noose has gradually
tightened over time, reducing the advantages of salary packaging
weighted in favor of particular remuneration components. This began
with the Australian Fringe Benefits Tax Act 1986, which dampened
earlier enthusiasm for perks in executive contracts. More recently, in
2009, amendments to the law relating to employee share schemes 76
had a comparable effect on equity-based payments, which had become
70. [20001 NSWIRComm 118 (decided Sept. 1, 2000). Justice Peterson describes the facts of
Canizales v Microsoft Corp. as constituting "a current zenith in cases of this type". Id. at 2. For a
discussion of the case, see generally Riley, supra note 66, 19-20; PHILLIPS & TOOMA, supra note
67, 3.70.
71. It was significant to a finding of unfairness that there was a lack of consideration given
to the future vesting of the options. Canizales, [20001 NSWIRComm 118 152. Justice Peterson
held that the executive was entitled to two months' notice prior to dismissal, and should
therefore be treated as if he were still an employee at the vesting date and therefore entitled to
A$14 million. See Riley, supra note 66, at 20.
72. See PHILLIPS & TOOMA, supra note 67, 3.70 (citing the second reading speech
introducing the Industrial Relations Amendment (Unfair Contracts) Bill 2002 for this
proposition). As a result of the state reforms, the operation of the unfair contracts jurisdiction
was restricted (in the case of employment contracts) to contracts with annual remuneration of
less than $200,000. See Industrial Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 108A (Austl.).
73. Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) (Austl.). These federal
reforms overrode all state industrial legislation dealing with unfair employment contracts in
respect of employers who are trading and financial corporations.
74. For a detailed analysis of the extent to which Australian tax laws affect executive
compensation levels and structure, see AGPC REMUNERATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 325-53.
Also, a comprehensive review of Commonwealth and state tax laws was released in December
2009. KEN HENRY ET AL., AUSTRALIA'S FUTURE TAX SYSTEM: REPORT TO THE TREASURER (2009).
75. For an overview of salary packaging, and its tax implications, in Australia, see PHILIP
BURGESS ET AL., INCOME TAXATION: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS, 260-63 (6th ed. 2009).
76. See Tax Laws Amendment (2009 Budget Measures No. 2) Act 2009 (Cth) (Austl.); Press
Release No. 103, Nick Sherry, Assistant Treasurer, Passage of Budget Bill Delivers $835 Million
to Bottom Line (Dec. 2, 2009), available at http://www.treasurer.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc
=pressreleases/2009/103.htm&pageID=O3&min--njsa&Year=&DocType=O.
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an increasingly popular component of executive compensation in
Australia.7 7 A particularly contentious aspect of the 2009 tax
amendments was the point in time at which employee share plans
should be taxed. The 2009 Australian legislation uses cessation of
employment as an automatic tax trigger, in spite of arguments that
this could conflict with emerging best practice in structuring executive
pay to include deferred holding periods for equity compensation to
reduce risk and short-termism.78
In the United States, as in Australia, director and executive
compensation has traditionally been treated as a matter of internal
management, in which the courts were notoriously reluctant to
interfere and relatively few constraints existed.79 Nonetheless, judicial
review of executive compensation has received greater prominence in
the United States as a result of the Walt Disney saga,80 which
proceeded through the Delaware Court of Chancery8l and the
Supreme Court82 during the last decade. Obiter dicta in the 2003
proceedings raised the specter that directors approving executive
compensation packages might in certain circumstances lose the
protection of the business judgment rule and exoneration clauses in
corporate charters.8 3 The final outcome of the Disney litigation was,
77. A policy justification for reforms to the taxation of employee share schemes was the
need to ensure that taxpayers are taxed consistently irrespective of the form of the relevant
compensation. AGPC REMUNERATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 329 box 10.3.
78. See id. at 337-39 (discussing how taxing equity-based payments at termination may
encourage short-termism and provide a disincentive to manage risk for sustainable long-term
returns). Some critics of the requirement to pay tax on equity-based payments at the point of
termination of employment also suggested that it would induce employers to increase other
components of executive compensation, such as short-term incentives or base pay. Id. at 337.
79. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An
Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 601-02 (2001); see also Charles M. Yablon,
Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1869
(1992) ("Executive compensation is another area in which corporate managers have been pretty
much free, as a matter of traditional corporate law doctrine and practice, to do whatever they
liked.").
80. For a succinct summary of the background facts relating to the notorious hiring, and
firing, of Michael Ovitz, see Recent Cases, In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. Civ. A.
15452, 2005 WL 2056651 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005), 119 HARV. L. REV. 923, 923-26 (2006). See
generally Jennifer S. Martin, The House of Mouse and Beyond: Assessing the SEC's Efforts to
Regulate Executive Compensation, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 481 (2007).
81. See, e.g., In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney 1), 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch.
2003); In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005).
82. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. Super. Ct. 2000); In re The Walt Disney
Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I11), 906 A.2d 27 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006).
83. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2010) (stating that a certificate of
incorporation may include a provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director
to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a
director, with some enumerated exceptions). According to Chancellor Chandler, the
572
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however, comforting to directors, confirming that, absent bad faith or
waste,8 4 directors have little to fear from judicial review.8 5 The case
demonstrated that there is a wide gap between aspirational best
practice in determining executive pay and legally enforceable duties.86
Disclosure rules and tax law have both had an influential role
in the regulation of executive pay in the United States. In 1992, the
SEC introduced landmark changes to its executive compensation
disclosure rules, which were designed to improve the transparency,
and comparability, of executive pay packages.87 These reforms have
been described as "perhaps the best known changes in policy
regarding executive pay, at least among economists."88 In the tax
realm, the introduction of Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") section
162(m) in the mid-1990s had a major impact on the structure of U.S.
pay packages.8 9  The provision, which disallows corporate tax
deduction for remuneration exceeding $1 million per annum unless it
is performance-based, resulted in relatively low levels of fixed pay
compared to variable pay in U.S. executive compensation packages. 90
In the United States, post-Enron reforms arguably had a lesser
impact on executive compensation than comparable Australian
reforms. Only two provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
circumstances under which this could occur were if the directors had "consciously and
intentionally disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a 'we don't care about the risks'
attitude." Disney I, 825 A.2d at 289.
84. See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591-92 (1933) ("If a bonus payment has no
relation to the value of services for which it is given, it is in reality a gift in part and the majority
stockholders have no power to give away corporate property against the protest of the minority.")
(citing Rogers v. Hill, 60 F.2d 109, 113-14 (1932) (Swan, J., dissenting)).
85. See generally Jennifer G. Hill, Regulating Executive Remuneration: International
Developments in the Post-Scandal Era, 3 EUR. COMPANY L. 64 (2006) (suggesting that the 2005
Disney 11 decision would appear to perpetuate what has been described as Delaware's "elaborate
theology of deference" to decisions of the board).
86. Id. at 72. A recent decision of the Delaware Supreme Court, Gantler v. Stephens, 965
A.2d 695 (Del. 2009), which recognizes that corporate officers have the same fiduciary duties as
directors, could provide an alternative judicial route to challenging executive compensation by
allowing courts to examine a CEO's conduct in the negotiation process. See Thomas & Wells,
supra note 9.
87. See Hill, supra note 30, at 246-47 (discussing the key elements of the disclosure
requirements under Regulation S-K of the SEC's rules and their underpinning policy).
88. Ian L. Dew-Becker, How Much Sunlight Does It Take to Disinfect a Boardroom? A Short
History of Executive Compensation Regulation in America, 55 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 434, 436
(2009). For background to the SEC disclosure rules, see also Martin, supra note 80.
89. I.R.C. § 162(m) (1995).
90. See Meredith R. Conway, Money for Nothing and the Stocks for Free: Taxing Executive
Compensation, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 383, 396 (2008) (discussing the history of I.R.C.
§ 162(m)); see also Ryan Miske, Note, Can't Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of
Trying to Control Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1673, 1687
(2004) (discussing the unintended consequences of I.R.C. § 162(m)).
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("Sarbanes-Oxley Act")9' dealt directly with pay-related issues. The
first was section 304. This was a statutory clawback provision,
permitting recovery of bonuses, incentive-based, or equity-based
compensation received by the CEO or CFO if the corporation is
required to restate earnings because of material non-compliance with
financial reporting requirements as a result of misconduct. 92 In spite
of the plethora of financial restatements in U.S. corporations since the
introduction of section 304, 93 successful actions under the provision
have been rare. 94 Secondly, section 402 prohibited the granting of
personal loans to directors or executive officers. It appears that this
was previously a widespread practice, which figured prominently in
the Enron and WorldCom scandals. 95 Also, new stock exchange listing
standards were adopted in 2003 that introduced a range of mandatory
corporate governance requirements 96 and expanded the scope of the
shareholder approval requirement for equity compensation. 97
91. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-66 (LEXIS 2010).
92. Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Executive
Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 347-49 (2009).
93. See Rachael E. Schwartz, The Clawback Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley: An Underutilized
Incentive to Keep the Corporate House Clean, 64 BUS. LAW. 1, 2, 13-15 (2008) (discussing the
large number of restatements since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed into law).
94. Id. (noting that six years after the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC had
successfully obtained clawbacks only twice). A range of factors have compromised the
effectiveness of section 304. For example, private clawback actions have been proscribed. See
Jeffrey N. Gordon, 'Say on Pay' Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case for
Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 334 n.39 (2009) (describing the factors that have
led the clawback provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to have an extraordinary limited effect).
Also, it was unclear whether the requisite "misconduct" under section 304 must be directly
attributable to the officer against whom reimbursement is sought. Note now, however, SEC v,
Jenkins, No. CV 09-1510-PHX-GMS, 2010 WL 2347020 (D. Ariz. June 9, 2010); John Savarese,
Sarbanes-Oxley "Clawback" Developments, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.,
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/06/24/sarbanes-oxley-clawback-developments/ (June
24, 2010, 9:11 ESTI).
95. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE LJ. 1521, 1538 (2005).
96. E.g., NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A (2003) (corporate governance rules).
Section 303A provided, with some limited exceptions, that listed companies must have a majority
of independent directors, id. § 303A.01, and must have a nominating/corporate governance and
compensation committee composed entirely of independent directors, id. § 303A.04-05. For
background to the NYSE corporate governance rules, see Hill, supra note 37, at 382 n.89.
97. See; Order Approving NYSE and Nasdaq Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Equity
Compensation Plans, 68 Fed. Reg. 39,995 (July 3, 2003); NYSE, INC., supra note 96, § 303A.08. It
has been argued, however, that the listing standards were structurally flawed in requiring only
that shareholders vote on the broad outline of a proposed plan, and not on individual executives'
stock option packages. See Developments in the Law, Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2169, 2218-20 (2004) (discussing how the rules did not permit shareholders to vote on a
particular executive's pay package, but only on how stock options may be used to compensate
executives in general).
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Enron and analogous scandals also raised concerns about
taxation and disclosure. Related changes were made to federal tax
law, the most significant being section 409A of the IRC, which became
effective in 2005. This provision limits the ability of executives to defer
compensation and to accelerate payments. 98 In the disclosure area,
although the SEC disclosure rules had been regarded as
comprehensive at the time of their introduction in 1992, 99 the scandals
exposed some regulatory flaws and deficiencies. The SEC responded to
these problems in 2006 by announcing the introduction of stricter
disclosure rules for executive pay to close existing loopholes in relation
to undisclosed executive perks. 100 The same year, a new scandal,
concerning backdating of stock options, surfaced in the United
States.101 To date, there has been no counterpart to this scandal in
Australia.
If the post-Enron regulatory response to the issue of executive
pay was somewhat muted in the United States, the same cannot be
said in relation to the global financial crisis. U.S. reforms responding
to the crisis originally focused on a narrow, specialized group of U.S.
corporations, namely those receiving government bailout funding.'0 2
98. See generally Steven J. Arsenault & W.R. Koprowski, The Policy of Regulating Deferral:
A Critique in Light of Internal Revenue Code Section 409A, 7 HoUS. Bus. & TAX L.J. 243 (2007)
(discussing the limits that I.R.C. § 409A imposed).
99. The NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Director Compensation, for example, praised
the 1992 SEC rules as making it "virtually impossible to conceal any form, or meaningful
amount" of executive compensation. See NAT'L ASS'N OF CORPORATE DIRS. ("NACD"), Report of
the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Director Compensation: Purposes, Principles, and Best
Practices 19 (1995).
100. See Joann S. Lublin & Kara Scannell, They Say Jump: SEC Plans Tougher Pay Rules,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2006, at Cl; Press Release, SEC Votes to Propose Changes to Disclosure
Requirements Concerning Executive Compensation and Related Matters (January 17, 2006). For
discussion of potential deficiencies of the disclosure-based regulatory scheme, particularly in the
light of relatively weak shareholder rights in the United States, see Martin, supra note 80;
Simon C.Y. Wong, Failings of U.S. Disclosure-Based Regulation, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2010, at 6.
101. See generally Jesse M. Fried, Option Backdating and Its Implications, 65 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 853 (2008) (discussing the economic implications of backdating stock options); M.P.
Narayanan, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, The Economic Impact of Backdating of
Executive Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597 (2007) (same).
102. See generally Jennifer G. Hill, New Trends in the Regulation of Executive Remuneration,
in DIRECTORS IN TROUBLED TIMES 100, 106-07 (R.P. Austin & A.Y. Bilski eds., 2009) (discussing
how the U.S. response was originally highly targeted towards financial institutions receiving
bailout money); John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, Is There a Case for Regulating Executive Pay in
the Financial Services Industry? (Jan. 25, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1544104 (discussing the standards for regulating compensation
practices at firms receiving financial assistance through the Troubled Asset Relief Program).
Reforms tied to federal bailout funding included the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, and the appointment of a Special
Master for TARP compensation. See 31 C.F.R. § 30.16 (discussing the authority of the Office of
the Special Master for TARP executive compensation).
575
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However, from mid-2009 onward, reform proposals expanded beyond
the bailout sector, and encompassed not only executive pay, but also
shareholder empowerment and corporate governance generally. 10 3 It
has been suggested that the global financial crisis ostensibly
introduced a new policy rationale for shareholder empowerment,
namely the need to restore market trust.10 4 These reform initiatives
have recently culminated in significant changes to executive
compensation and shareholder powers under the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, including the
introduction of a say-on-pay requirement.10 5
The global financial crisis has also produced a wide range of
regulatory responses to executive compensation in Australia. 10 6 For
example, in December 2009, the Australian Government Productivity
Commission issued a report on executive remuneration, 10 7 which made
seventeen recommendations for reform. 08 The most controversial of
103. See Hill, Rising Tension, supra note 43, at 348-49.
104. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 656-57 (2010) (discussing how shareholder proponents
have shifted their emphasis in the wake of the financial crisis away from market control toward
the need to restore trust).
105. Other executive compensation related amendments under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 include: independence requirements for
compensation committees and their advisers; disclosure regarding pay disparity within the firm
and the relationship between pay and performance; and clawback requirements. See generally
Jeremy L. Goldstein, Some Dodd-Frank Executive Compensation Action Items, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG., (Aug 12, 2010 9:12 AM EDT), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2010/08/12some.dodd.frank-executive-compensation-action-items.
106. These have included a review of executive compensation in financial institutions by
APRA; a report by the AGPC; guidelines on executive pay by the Australian Institute of
Company Directors; and a policy statement on executive remuneration by the Australian
Shareholders Association. See generally Hill, supra note 102. Also, in May 2010, the Australian
government provided a reference to the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee
("CAMAC') to advise on revisions to the reporting requirements in § 300A and remuneration
reports, which could reduce complexity. See CAMAC, EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION: INFORMATION
PAPER § 2 (2010), available at http://www.camac.gov.au/cama/camac.nsf/byHeadline
/PDFDiscussion+Papers/$file/Executive-rem-infopaperJullO.pdf.
107. See AGPC REMUNERATION REPORT, supra note 13.
108.In April 2010, the Australian Government responded to the Productivity Commission,
supporting virtually all its recommendations. See Joint Media Release, Minister for Financial
Services, Superannuation & Corporate Law, Treasurer and Assistant Treasurer, Government
Responds to the Productivity Commission Report on Executive Remuneration (April 16, 2010),
available at http:l/www.treasurer.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2010/033.htm&
pageID=003&min=ceba&Year=&DocType=O (' The Government supports nearly all of the PC's
recommendations."). The same month, the ASX Corporate Governance Council released proposed
amendments to its corporate governance principles, in response to some of the Productivity
Commission's recommendations. See ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7.1-.4 (April 22, 2010), available at
HeinOnline  -- 64 Vand. L. Rev. 576 2011
2011] CEO EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT PROVISIONS 577
these relates to strengthening the non-binding shareholder vote
through the introduction of a "two strikes" rule, under which
consecutive "no" votes could activate a separate "re-election"
resolution. 109 Also, Australia adopted new legislation"0 dealing with
"golden handshakes" in 2009."' The previous law on termination
pay" 2 had been strongly criticized as overly generous to executive
officers, 11 3 and potentially delivering "rewards for failure." 14 A key
aspect of the 2009 legislation is that it caps a senior officer's or
director's termination pay at one year's average base salary-a
significant reduction from the previous seven-year total compensation
threshold-unless shareholder approval is obtained.1"
5
The regulatory responses of the U.S. and Australian
governments to the global financial crisis suggest that executive
http://203.15.147.66/about/pdf/2010042 l-proposed-change s-to-corporategovern ance-principles.
pdf.
109. See AGPC REMUNERATION REPORT, supra note 13, Recommendation 15, at xl, 294.
Under this proposed reform, a twenty-five percent "no" vote on the remuneration report would
trigger a formal obligation on the board to explain how shareholder concerns are being
addressed. Two consecutive "no" votes of twenty-five percent or more would activate a separate
re-election resolution, which, if successful, would require all elected directors who signed the
remuneration report to submit to re-election at an extraordinary general meeting to be held
within ninety days. Id. at xxxii.
110. See Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Termination Payments)Act
2009 (Cth) (Austl.), which received Royal Assent on November 23, 2009.
111.See Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Termination Payments) Bill
2009 (Cth) (Austl.), available at http://www.aph.gov.aulibrary/pubs/BD/2009-1O/lObdOO6.htm.
For an overview of key policy issues relating to termination pay, see Geofrey P. Stapledon,
Termination Benefits for Executives of Australian Companies, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 683 (2005).
112. See, e.g., Kym Sheehan & Colin Fenwick, Seven: The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth),
Corporate Governance and Termination Payments to Senior Employees, 32 MELB. U. L. REV. 199,
201 (2008) (highlighting the large termination payments that could be given while remaining
under the Part 2D.2 threshold and the ASX threshold); RiskMetrics Group, Press Release,
Shareholders Pay the High Cost of Failure: Average CEO Gets $3.4 Million to Walk (Nov. 26,
2008).
113. Under Part 2D.2 of the Corporations Act (former section 200F), shareholder consent was
only required if termination benefits exceeded seven times a director's annual remuneration
package. See, e.g., Dean Paatsch & Martin Lawrence, Money for Nothing, Bus. SPECTATOR, Jul.
17, 2008, available at http:/fbusinessspectator.mobibs.nsf/ArticleMoney-for-nothing-
GL32H?OpenDocument&src-is (describing Part 2D.2 of the Corporations Act as "in reality a
dead letter").
114. See generally Stapledon, supra note 111.
115. A number of changes were made during the passage of the Corporations Amendment
(Improving Accountability on Termination Payments) Bill 2009. For a summary of differences
between a May 2009 Exposure Draft of the Bill and the actual Bill, which was introduced into
the House of Representatives on June 24 2009, see Justine Turnbull & Michael Gonski, Limits
on Termination Payments: Bill Introduced into Parliament FREEHILLS (June 26, 2009),
http://www.freehills.com.au/5121.aspx; Government Introduces Executive Termination Payment
Laws into Parliament MALLESONS STEPHEN JACQUES (June 24, 2009), http://www.mallesons.
com/publications/2009/Jun/9966946W.htm.
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compensation is perceived as a serious problem in both jurisdictions.
How do levels of executive compensation in the United States and
Australia compare? Executive compensation in the United States has
steadily increased since the mid-1970s, 116 but it skyrocketed during
the 1990s. Between 1993 and 2003, the average CEO compensation at
S&P 500 firms rose by 146 percent. 117 There has also been a
significant escalation in CEO pay packages in Australia. From 2001-
2007, both the median fixed remuneration (that is, non-performance-
based elements of Australian CEO pay) and the median total
remuneration had increased by around ninety-six percent in total. 118 A
2008 industry report shows that average CEO pay in the top 100
listed Australian companies increased from A$3.77 million in 2005 to
A$5.53 million in 2007.119 A common explanation for this steep rise in
executive pay is the fact that Australian companies increasingly need
to compete internationally, and now appoint executives from a "mobile
worldwide executive talent pool."120 Another potentially relevant
factor is firm size. 121
Nonetheless, U.S. CEOs tend to receive higher levels of total
remuneration than their counterparts in other jurisdictions, including
Australia.122 The 2008 annual reports of Australia's top fifteen
companies reveal that, excluding share-based compensation, the CEOs
earned approximately 135 times more than the average Australian
employee. 123 In the United States, the average executive manager in
the largest fifteen U.S. firms earned around 500 times more than an
average employee in 2007.124
116. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998,
118 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2003); Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation: A New
View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 14145, 2008), available at http://www.nber.orgpapersw14145.
117. See Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 9. Average CEO compensation at S&P 500 firms
rose from $3.7 million to $9.1 million between 1993 and 2003. The average compensation of the
top five executives increased 125 percent from $9.5 million to $21.4 million during this period.
Id. at 285.
118. Media Release, ACSI, Top 100 CEO Pay Research Released (Oct. 27, 2008), available at
http://www.acsi.org.au/documents/27.10.08%2OMedia%2ORelease%20PRfinaICEO%20pay.pdf.
119. Id.
120. Deborah Tarrant, Payday Paralysis, INTHEBLACK, Mar. 2009, at 28, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/miqa5393/is_..200903/ain31666136/.
121. See, e.g., Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?,
123 Q.J. ECON. 49, 49 (2008) ("In market equilibrium, CEO's pay depends on both the size of his
firm, and the aggregate firm size."); Frydman & Saks, supra note 116, at 1, 3, 17.
122. Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or
Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1173--75 (2004).
123. Tarrant, supra note 120.
124. INT'L LABOUR ORG. & INT'L INST. FOR LABOUR STUDIES, WORLD OF WORK REPORT 2008:
INCOME INEQUALITIES IN THE AGE OF FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION, Executive Summary 3 (2008),
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For our project, it is important to be conscious of the
underlying differences in these two national legal systems. Executive
employment contracts, or service agreements as they are called in
Australia, are written against the backdrop of these specific rules and
regulations, but also with the underlying regulatory culture in mind.
As we will see in the subsequent sections, many of the differences in
the contracts we examine may well be directly related to differences in
the background legal rules. At the same time, there are many
similarities between the contracts from the two countries even though
the two legal systems are different. We turn next to a brief overview of
the prior literature.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Theorists have discussed contracting between firms and their
executives extensively over the years, 125 but only recently, and largely
only in the United States, have the actual agreements been examined
by empiricists. Researchers have found a complex set of contracts that
govern the relationships between American CEOs and their publicly
held firms. The details of these contracts are publicly disclosed in
various degrees of detail as a result of the SEC requirements. Outside
the United States, it is rare to see disclosure of any information
concerning these contracts. In 2003, however, the ASX made it clear
that disclosure of summaries of certain key agreements, such as a
CEO's employment contract, is generally required under the
Australian continuous disclosure regime. 126 The dearth of consistent
Australian data was also noted by the Productivity Commission in its
December 2009 report on executive remuneration. 127 We are the first
to compare U.S. and Australian CEO employment contracts. There
are, however, a number of earlier empirical studies of U.S. CEO
employment contracts and other contractual agreements with their
firms. We summarize the most relevant of these below.
available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public@dgreports@dcomm@publldocuments
article/wcms_100613.pdf.
125. See generally 1 KEVIN F. HALLOCK & KEVIN J. MURPHY, THE ECONOMICS OF EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION pt. 1 (1999).
126. See, e.g., ASX CGC 2003, supra note 21, principle 9, at 51-56. ("Entering employment
agreements with key executives, or obligations under these agreements falling due, may trigger
a continuous disclosure obligation under ASX Listing Rule 3.1. Where this is the case, disclosure
to the market should include a summary of the main elements and terms of the agreement,
including termination entitlements.")
127. AGPC REMUNERATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 11.
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A. Employment Contracts
In 2006, Stewart J. Schwab and Randall S. Thomas became the
first to conduct a legal and empirical analysis of American CEOs'
employment contract terms. 128 After providing an overview of the
process by which these agreements are negotiated, the authors
examine the key legal characteristics of 375 employment contracts. In
addition to reporting descriptive statistics on these legal features, they
also compare the employment contract provisions with those found in
a sample of 121 change-in-control agreements; they find several
significant differences between these two types of contracts.
In 2009, Stuart L. Gillan, Jay C. Hartzell, and Robert Parrino
authored the second major paper examining CEO employment
contracts. 129 They ask why firms enter into explicit as opposed to
implicit employment contracts with their CEOs, examining all of the
firms in the S&P 500 as of January 1, 2000. They find that of these
firms, 184 have explicit CEO employment contracts, forty-one disclose
the existence of such an agreement but the researchers cannot find it,
and 269 have no written agreement with their CEO. They find that
explicit employment agreements are more common for firms:
operating in risky business environments, with "outside" CEOs who
come in to the job from another firm, or with CEOs who have more to
lose if the firm breaches the contract because they have higher
abnormal compensation levels or larger fractions of their pay in the
form of incentive-based pay. Moreover, they show that the length of a
CEO contract depends on the same set of factors as the decision to
award an explicit contract, so that longer contracts are awarded to
outside CEOs and to those CEOs more at risk of having their firms
renegotiate the terms of their contract.
B. Severance Agreements
A second set of studies examines severance pay and
agreements for American CEOs. David Yermack's article on severance
pay for dismissed or retired executives asks whether there is any
correlation between the existence of formal severance contracts and
128. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment
Contracts: What do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231 (2006). For a
model form executive employment contract, see Joan MacLeod Heminway & Trace Blankenship,
Executive Employment Agreements in Tennessee: An Annotated Model Tennessee Executive
Employment Agreement, 10 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. OF Bus. L. 141, 142 (2009).
129. Stuart L. Gillan et al., Explicit Versus Implicit Contracts: Evidence from CEO
Employment Contracts, 64 J. OF FIN. 1629, 1629 (2009).
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the award of severance pay.130 He finds that more than half of a
sample of 179 CEOs of Fortune 500 companies who left firms between
1996 and 2002 received severance pay with a mean value of $5.4
million, although this is less than one year's average CEO
compensation. However, the large majority of these payments (eighty-
three percent) are paid at the discretion of the board and not pursuant
to a previous employment agreement. CEOs who are dismissed are
much more likely to be paid separation payments than those who
retire voluntarily and they receive much larger amounts of pay.
Rusticus studies the relationship between severance
agreements and CEO turnover. 131 Using a sample of 305 newly hired
CEOs at S&P 1500 firms between 1994 and 1999, he finds that about
half of them have severance agreements and the median amount paid
is two years' cash compensation. He finds that severance agreements'
presence is positively correlated with uncertainty about the CEOs'
abilities as measured by their number of years with the firm before
becoming a CEO, the degree of uncertainty about the firm's operating
environment, and higher amounts of compensation awarded to the
executive. The dollar amount of the payments is correlated with the
size of their annual cash compensation, firm size, and whether the
CEO is an outsider.
A contemporaneous paper by Ewa Sletten and Thomas Lys
uses a sample of 150 CEOs who started in their positions between
1992 and 2003.132 They find that fifty percent of these executives have
formal ex ante severance agreements, while sixty-five percent of all
these CEOs receive separation payments at their departure. The mean
payments are $5.37 million in 2003 dollars. They argue that ex ante
severance agreements offer payments as a form of insurance to
executives joining riskier firms, outside CEOs, and CEOs whose
predecessors were forced to leave the firm, all of whom contract for
higher severance payments. They also find support for the claim that
CEOs with confidentiality agreements are more likely to contract for
higher ex ante severance, although not so for CEOs with non-
competition agreements.
Raghavendra Rau and Jin Xu analyze 2,192 severance
agreements for 1,788 high-level executives at 862 firms listed on the
130. David Yermack, Golden Handshakes: Separation Pay for Retired and Dismissed CEOs,
41 J. ACCT. & ECON. 237, 237 (2006) (noting that golden handshakes refer to separation packages
awarded to CEOs when they retire or are dismissed).
131. TIJomme 0. Rusticus, Executive Severance Agreements (February 21, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
132. Ewa Sletten & Thomas Lys, Motives for and Risk-Incentive Implications for CEO
Severance (Mar. 30, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the authors).
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COMPUSTAT database in 2004.133 They define severance agreements
to cover both change-in-control agreements as well as employment
contracts that provide for termination with good reason or without
cause. They find that severance pay increases as firm risk increases,
particularly for small firms and firms that are likely takeover targets.
Change-in-control agreements lead to significantly higher severance
pay and are more common at firms with high institutional ownership
levels if the executive is a CEO or Board Chairman.
C. Bonus Agreements
Bonus contracts have been examined by several different
researchers. Kevin J. Murphy has an early study of the use of
performance standards in executive bonus contracts using proprietary
data on 177 plans collected by a compensation consulting firm.134 He
finds that "internal" performance standards, which are based in large
part on management's actions or performance in the current or prior
year, are of one of two types: either they are tied to prior-year firm
performance or they are based on the company's business plan or
budget. Eighty-nine percent of companies rely on internal standards
for their bonus plans. The remainder of the plans use "external"
standards based on measures such as the performance of external
peer companies. Companies are more likely to choose external
measures when prior-year performance is a noisy measure of current
performance. He also finds that income smoothing is prevalent at
companies using internal standards, but not in companies using
external standards.
Mary Ellen Carter, Luann Lynch, and Sarah L. Center
Zechman look at the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on bonus
agreements, hypothesizing that firms would place greater emphasis
on bonus arrangements after financial reporting discretion decreased
following the passage of the Act and other reform bills.135 Using prior-
year earnings as the target for the bonus contracts, and an estimated
weight on the change in earnings as a proxy for the effort incentive
provided to managers, they find that firms place significantly more
weight on earnings changes in the bonus contract post-Sarbanes-
Oxley than in prior years and that the relationship with bonuses and
133. P. Raghavendra Rau & Jin Xu, Getting Rich by Getting Fired? An Analysis of Severance
Pay Contracts (Dec. 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the authors).
134. Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Standards in Incentive Contracts, 30 J. ACCT. & ECON.
245, 246 (2000).
135. Mary Ellen Carter et al., Changes in Bonus Contracts in the Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Era,
14 REV. AccT. STUD. 480, 480-81 (2009).
582 [Vol. 64:2:559
HeinOnline  -- 64 Vand. L. Rev. 582 2011
2011] CEO EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT PROVISIONS
earnings increases is significantly greater in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley
period as well.
Daniel Sungyeon Kim and Jun Yang document the different
characteristics of annual incentive bonus plans for CEOs using the
SEC's newly mandated disclosures that became effective on December
15, 2006.136 Their sample includes all of the S&P 500 firms for the
three years after the reporting change occurred. They report that the
five main performance measures are earnings per share ("EPS"),
revenue, operating income, net income, and free cash flow. They find
that EPS targets are consistently set below the level of expected EPS
and below the levels projected by analysts, and that EPS targets are
lower than historical growth levels for the firms. Moreover, they find
that actual bonus payouts are 114 percent of target payouts on
average.
D. Stock Option Awards and Plans
Stock options' features differ substantially across countries.
For example, performance-based vesting conditions have traditionally
been uncommon in the United States, although widespread in
Australia. J. Carr Bettis, John Bizjak, Jeffrey Coles, and
Swaminathan L. Kalpathy study a sample of 983 U.S. stock option
awards that include either accelerated or contingent-vested provisions
based on firm performance. 137 Contingent-vesting awards require one
or more performance hurdles to be met for the grant to vest, whereas
with accelerated-vesting options, the award vests early if the specified
performance condition is met. They find that most performance-
vesting grants have significant hurdles for vesting, such as stock price
increases, or another event causing accelerated vesting to occur, and
that firms that award them have significantly better operating
performance than control firms. The likelihood of using performance-
vesting options is positively related to the proportion of outsiders on
the board and the presence of a new CEO, and negatively related to
prior stock performance.
Sandeep Dahiya and Yermack study sunset provisions for
modifying the terms of company stock option plans when managers
136. Daniel Sungyeon Kim & Jun Yang, Beating the Target: A Closer Look at Annual
Incentive Plans 1 (AFA 2010 Atlanta Meetings Paper, Dec. 18, 2009) available at http:Ilssrn.
comabstract=1361814.
137. Carr Bettis et al., Stock and Option Grants with Performance-Based Vesting Provisions
2 (AFA 2008 New Orleans Paper, Oct. 2008) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=972424.
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retire, die, or resign from their firms. 138 Using data for companies in
the S&P 500 index in-the fall of 2005, they study 389 firms' option
plans or term sheets to find whether the expiration date of options
changes when an executive leaves the firm or whether the vesting or
exercisability terms change at that point. They find that managers
who retire face stronger sunset rules (and suffer larger value losses) at
firms with strong growth opportunities. Such firms exhibit lower
management turnover. Executives that resign face harsh sunset rules
and are generally accorded very short periods of time to exercise their
options. Given the relatively short time period for employment of
many corporate executives, these results are consistent with the claim
that a majority of option exercises occur after the executive has left
the company-with a substantial loss in their value being experienced
by the executive.
E. Retirement Plans and Pensions
Pensions and retirement plans normally comprise an important
subset of the contracts between a firm and an executive. Although
many of the key terms of such plans are not publicly disclosed, Lucian
A. Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson, Jr. estimate the annual value of
pension benefits for CEOs who left their firms in 2003 and the first
five months of 2004.139 They find that pension benefits constitute a
large portion of total executive compensation for many executives.
They discover that these benefits are not performance-sensitive
because they are largely tied to base salary, or other fixed
compensation measures, in the years preceding the executive's
departure.
Joseph Gerakos focuses on CEOs' potential tradeoff between
pension benefits and other forms of compensation. 140 His sample is
comprised of 442 CEOs from S&P 500 companies as of 2005. He finds
that U.S. CEOs trade off forty-eight cents of cash compensation and
equity grants for every dollar of additional pension benefits they
receive from their firms. As this is less than a dollar-for-dollar
tradeoff, he argues that it is consistent with CEOs having a degree of
power over their boards of directors.
138. Sandeep Dahiya & David Yermack, You Can't Take It with You: Sunset Provisions for
Equity Compensation When Managers Retire, Resign or Die 1 (N.Y. Univ. Working Paper No.
FINJ-06-016, Dec 15, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1300766.
139. Lucian A Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L. 823,
825-26 (2005).
140. Joseph Gerakos, Chief Executive Officers and the Pay-Pension Tradeoff (Univ. of Chi.
Booth Sch. of Bus., Working Paper, Dec. 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1166145.
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Paul Kalyta uses a sample of the sixty largest firms on the
Toronto Stock Exchange to examine supplemental executive
retirement plans ("SERPs"). 141 He finds that while more transparent
forms of compensation (salaries, bonuses, and stock options) appear to
be driven by economic variables at firms, SERP benefits, which are
very difficult to observe, are closely related to an executive's power
with respect to the firm's board of directors. He further finds that
where managers' SERP benefits are contingent on firm performance,
the company will have lower research and development ("R&D")
expenditures in the last few years prior to the executive's retirement,
which is consistent with managerial behavior aimed at maintaining
higher current earnings at the expense of future returns.
F. Other Contractual Clauses
There is a wide variety of other provisions that are part of the
contractual web between executives and their firms. The enforcement
of non-competition provisions or agreements represents another type
of restriction that has been examined in a paper by Mark J.
Garmaise. 142 Using a random sample of 500 Execucomp firms, he finds
that 70.2 percent of these firms use these agreements. -43 He analyzes
differential enforcement patterns across states for non-competition
agreements and finds that stronger enforcement makes it more likely
that a firm will employ such agreements. Increased enforceability is
also correlated with reduced executive mobility, reduced R&D
expenditures, and lower capital expenditures per employee.
Finally, Thomas, Erin A. O'Hara, and Kenneth J. Martin study
the use of arbitration provisions in CEO employment contracts.144
With a sample of 551 contracts, they find that only approximately one-
half of these contracts contain arbitration clauses. Arbitration
provisions are more likely to appear in contracts of CEOs at firms in
industries that are experiencing rapid levels of change or that are less
profitable. They do not find that arbitration clauses are more likely at
firms where the executive has a greater amount of power.
141. Paul Kalyta, Compensation Transparency and Managerial Opportunism: A Study of
Supplemental Retirement Plans, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 405, 411 (2009).
142. Mark J. Garmaise, Ties That Truly Bind: Non-competition Agreements, Executive
Compensation and Firm Investment, J.L. ECON. & ORG. (Nov. 3, 2009), http://jleo.oxfordjournals.
orglcontent/early/2009/1 1/03/jleo.ewp033.fuU.pdf+html.
143. Id. at 21.
144. Randall S. Thomas et al., Arbitration Clauses in CEO Employment Contracts: An
Empirical and Theoretical Analysis, 63 VAND. L. REV. 959 (2010).
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In sum, prior empirical work has focused on the United States'
contracting experience without comparison to how other countries'
systems operate. In the remainder of this Article, we extend that work
by engaging in comparative analysis for CEO employment contracts.
III. METHODOLOGY
The biggest challenge in this project was to collect comparable
sets of employment contracts in the two countries. While for many
years the U.S. disclosure rules have required registered firms to
disclose all material contracts with their executives, Australian rules
are less demanding. They do not require firms to disclose the full
contracts. As noted in Section I, it was only after 2003 that ASX
listing rules recognized that Australian firms had an obligation, as
part of their continuous disclosure regime, to disclose information
about these contracts at the time of entering employment contracts
with key executives. 145 However, the level of disclosure required is
well short of providing the actual agreements, and instead companies
provide a summary of the contract's terms. Similarly, although the
Corporations Act mandates that listed companies must disclose
specific information concerning the remuneration of key management
personnel in the annual directors' report,146 it does not require full
disclosure of executive contracts. As we explain below, this made the
data collection process a major challenge.
A. U.S. Data Collection
With the U.S. data, we used the EDGAR, 10-K Wizard, and
LiveEdgar databases to locate all employment contracts for chief
executive officers at S&P 1500 companies from 1995 to 2008. Each of
these databases contains all SEC filings made by U.S.-registered
companies under the federal securities, laws. Under existing securities
law disclosure requirements, U.S. companies are required to disclose
on EDGAR their CEOs' employment agreements.
We located these CEO employment contracts using a variety of
search techniques. First, we examined each company's definitive proxy
statements for each sample year. In the compensation section of these
filings, companies are required to discuss any material contracts that
exist between them and their senior officers. We relied on these
disclosures to reveal all CEO employment contracts for these
145. See ASX CGC 2003, supra note 21, principle 9, at 53.
146. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 300A (Austl.).
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companies during this time period. However, as we proceeded in our
search, we quickly realized that very few contracts were attached to
firms' proxy statements and that we needed to search through the
firms' other SEC filings in order to find the contracts. We therefore
supplemented our initial search by checking SEC filings whose filing
dates were close to the date of the contract. In many cases, this
resulted in finding the contract.
If we still could not find the contracts, then we used keyword
searches of SEC filings made by each company. We searched the
following phrases: "employment contract," "employment agreement,"
"executive agreement," and any title for a contract that was listed in
the company's proxy statement.147 Using these search terms, we found
a number of additional contracts attached to a wide variety of
different SEC filings. Companies did not appear to systematically use
any particular type of filing for disclosing these contracts, although we
frequently found them attached to 10-Ks, 10-Qs, 8-Ks, and for
companies issuing stock for the first time, S-is. We were generally
unable to find contracts that predated the beginning of the subject
companies' EDGAR filings, usually in 1996, and in a limited number
of cases, we were unable to find contracts that were disclosed in the
companies' proxy statements even after the companies commenced
filing disclosure documents because the contracts did not appear to be
attached to any of the companies' SEC filings.148
We read the companies' proxy statements whenever they
discussed their CEOs' employment contracts. While companies
provided extensive disclosures concerning the contents of these
employment contracts, once we compared these disclosures with the
contracts themselves, we found that there were frequent
discrepancies. Therefore we determined that it was necessary to code
the contracts themselves in order to ensure greater accuracy in our
data. We wrote a coding manual for the contracts so that each variable
that we were interested in could be systematically collected. We
collected a comprehensive set of important contract information,
including basic compensation information, severance, perquisites, and
various legal constraints on the CEO and the firm. For example, we
generally collected severance information from an employment
147. For example, if the proxy statement stated that the company's CEO had an
"Employment Understanding Agreement," we would specifically search using that term.
148. Given that we exhaustively searched through every filing made, we suspect that these
contracts either were not filed with the SEC, or that the document that they were attached to
was not available on EDGAR. In light of its decision to require the contracts' disclosure, the SEC
should instruct companies where to attach the documents to facilitate public access to this
information and to permit it to monitor their compliance with the disclosure requirement.
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contract under the subsection, "Compensation after termination of
employment/Company obligations after termination of
employment/Severance Payments."
We augmented this with data from the Execucomp database,
from which we extracted further information on CEO compensation
details, especially bonuses, CEO age, and CEO tenure and
appointment date. In addition, we extracted information on stock daily
returns from the CRSP database to calculate daily return standard
deviations and extracted GICS industry codes and book value of assets
from the Compustat database.
B. Australian Data Collection
For Australian data, we started by deciding to study the
sample of firms in the ASX 200. This stock index covers the largest
publicly listed firms based in Australia. To assemble our sample of
firms, we began by obtaining a list of the ASX 200 firms in 2003 and
tracked forward in time to obtain new additions, deletions, and name
changes and their dates. We also searched for whether any of these
firms were cross-listed on a major U.S. stock exchange at the CEO
contract start date.
To obtain CEO employment contracts of firms in the ASX200,
we first contacted each firm individually, requesting a copy of their
current CEO's employment contract subject to the terms of a non-
disclosure agreement, if they requested one. Using this process, we
obtained thirty-four CEO employment contracts from thirty-one
Australian firms. Next, we examined whether any of our sample firms
made filings with the ASIC that included their CEOs' employment
contracts. We did the same type of search for the firms cross-listed in
the United States and looked for this information in SEC filings. We
obtained a number of additional contracts in this manner.
As mentioned earlier, in 2003 Australian-listed companies
were advised by the ASX Corporate Governance Council that firms
were required to report current contract details and details on any
new contracts entered into when CEOs are renewed or replaced ("The
Summary Terms of Employment"). 149 CEO employment contract
summaries include compensation details such as salary, bonuses,
restricted stock and stock options, long-term performance incentives,
and severance agreements. Also, under section 300A of the
Corporations Act, listed companies must disclose certain information
concerning the remuneration of key management personnel in the
149. ASX CGC 2003, supra note 21, principle 9, at 51.
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directors' report section of the company's annual report. 150 Although
this provision requires disclosure of only specific information, some
corporations include full employment contracts in their appendices to
the annual reports. The degree of completeness of these contract
summaries and information provided under the disclosure
requirements of section 300A of the Corporations Act varies greatly,
and therefore we were only able to use those summaries that included
compensation and severance details. For the purposes of coding these
contracts' primary features, we used a detailed coding manual
modified from our original employment contract manual used for
coding U.S. employment contracts.
In addition, we used the Fin Analysis database, maintained by
Huntleys' Investment Information Pty. Limited (a wholly owned
subsidiary of Morningstar, Inc.), to locate the ASX Announcement of
CEO/Managing Director Appointment and the change/renewal of
employment agreement. The Summary Terms of Employment was
usually attached to the Announcement of Appointment, which is
categorized under "Company Administration."
The Summary Terms of Employment does not specify all the
employment terms, in particular the terms which were disclosed as
standard employment policy, such as the long-term incentive payment
schedule and the trading policy of equity base rewards. We therefore
supplemented the Summary Terms of Employment by retrieving the
relevant information from the annual report of the respective financial
year. We also ran the key phrase searches through the web search
engines Google.com.au and Bing.com. The search phrases were "CEO
employment contracts," "CEO terms of employment," and "CEO
appointment announcement." By going through the first twenty pages
of search results of both search engines, we found an additional
fourteen Summary Terms of Employment of CEOs.
To obtain information on which stocks are cross-listed, we used
two databases. We used the EDGAR database to locate the forms of
registration and deregistration filed by the Australian companies. We
identified cross-listed firms using the SEC's Form List Forms F-3, F-i,
and 425, which are related to registration of foreign companies, and
Form 15F for deregistration. We then searched the EDGAR database
in two ways: first, using the "EDGAR Full-Text Search" to search the
full text of EDGAR filings from the last four years of the Australian
companies; and second, we looked in the "Historical EDGAR Archives"
which allows us to retrieve the record of filings from 1994 through
2010. The second database that we used is the Australian database
150. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 300A (Austl.).
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"Fin Analysis." We searched the Archives of Announcements to locate
the announcements of registration and deregistration in the U.S.
exchange markets.
To obtain information about Australian CEOs' nationality, and
particularly whether they are U.S. citizens, we used a number of data
sources including the ASX Announcement of Appointment, the annual
report, company websites, and other online databases, such as
Reuters, BusinessWeek, Wikipedia, Who's Who, Bloomberg,
Newsweek, and Hoovers-People. To obtain the initial appointment
dates of CEOs, we used multiple data sources including the Fin
Analysis database and the Dat Analysis database, as well as our CEO
employment contracts, their summaries, and any news reports about
our sample companies.
To obtain daily stock returns for the year prior to the contract
start date, we used Datastream to download the daily closing price
(adjusted) in the last eight years of the current ASX200 companies.
For the delisted companies, we downloaded the daily closing price
(adjusted) of the year prior to the contract start date from
Morningside's Dat Analysis database and converted these into daily
returns. We then used the daily returns for the prior year to calculate
return standard deviations. We obtained daily Australian-U.S. dollar
foreign exchange rates on the Australian contract start date and the
fiscal year-end prior to the Australian contract start date, which is the
date of the book value of total assets, from the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis website. 151
Our Australian employment contract data is by necessity a
combination of full CEO employment contracts and contract
summaries taken from two sources: the reports required to be
disclosed in annual reports and company releases to the ASX at the
time new CEO contracts are signed. Although the summaries and
press releases contain data on major contract features, we want to do
further analysis on the reliability of this information. Our concern is
that an implicit assumption of the Australian disclosure regime is that
the summaries and press releases are adequate for supplying
investors and securities analysts with the details of the economically
important elements of the CEO contracts, but that this is an
empirically untested proposition. 152
151. Daily Rates, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, http://research.stlouisfed.orgfred2/
categoriesl94.
152. It is interesting that, although the AGPC specifically commented on the lack of
consistent data relating to executive remuneration in Australia in its December 2009 report on
executive remuneration, the Commission did not recommend full contract disclosure. See AGPC
REMUNERATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 11.
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As an initial approach to assessing the adequacy of the
Australian firm disclosures, we had two research associates separately
code this subsample of CEO employment contracts, one using the
actual employment contract and the other using only the company
summaries coming from the press releases and remuneration reports.
We then compared Australian contract features based on the two
different data sources. We find that the summaries are generally
fairly accurate. However, for contract features that are not required to
be disclosed, namely items that are not included in CEO compensation
or severance agreements, the summaries are not always complete.
This means that for these contract features, we may be unavoidably
undercounting occurrences of some of these contract elements. Of
course, this comparison is far from definitive since firms that are
willing to voluntarily release their CEOs' full employment contracts
may also be more forthcoming in their contract summaries. On the
other hand, it is also possible that even with this potential bias, we
may still find that the required summary information is less than
adequate when it comes to obtaining a clear picture of the CEOs'
economic incentives.
C. Matching Procedures for U.S. and Australian Contracts
In comparing Australian and U.S. firms that are publicly listed
and represented on the ASX 200 and the S&P 1500, it is immediately
obvious that the distribution of firms by industry and by firm size are
drastically different, with Australia having a relatively larger number
of mining and finance firms and fewer firms in technology-intensive
and large-scale manufacturing industries. Australia also has far fewer
firms generally, and the typical size of these firms is much smaller.
With these differences in mind, we concluded that comparing the full
populations of firms in the two countries was highly problematic, even
in a multivariate regression context, because we would need a great
deal of confidence about the correct specifications of the model to
control for such large-scale differences in basic characteristics. It also
requires adequate controls for industry differences that could have a
dynamic component, which industry-fixed effects are unlikely to fully
control for. As a result of these considerations, we concluded that it
would be necessary to use matched pairs based on a few key firm
characteristics (firm size and industry). We also decided that we
needed to roughly match contract start dates, since there is a clear
temporal trend in certain key contract features, particularly
compensation levels.
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Our approach to matching the contracts is as follows. We
exploit the fact that there is a much larger population of U.S. firms
from which to attempt to select a good match for each Australian
contract on which we have sufficient information. To match on
industry, we require U.S. firms to be drawn from the same two-digit
GICS industry classification. To match on calendar time, the contract
start dates must be within two calendar years of each other. Finally,
to match on firm size, we require the firms' book values closest to the
contract date (or averaged across the two adjacent fiscal years) to be
within three hundred percent of each other.
We match on firm size because recent U.S. empirical research
suggests that, since the mid-1970s, 153 American CEO pay levels have
been strongly correlated with increases in market capitalization. 154 In
Australia, this correlation appears to exist as well, 155 and there has
been a dramatic increase in the market capitalization of a number of
corporations over the last decades. The current market capitalization
of BHP Billiton, for example, is $200 billion, compared to $16 billion in
1989.156
This matching process is complicated by two considerations:
first, we need to value all dollar-denominated contract features in a
single currency, which we accomplish by converting Australian dollars
into U.S. dollars on the date of the Australian CEO contract start date
and the Australian firm's fiscal year-end; and second, we need to
adjust for the fact that Australian firms generally have fiscal year-
ends that fall on June 30, while U.S. firm fiscal year-ends typically fall
on December 31. To adjust for these calendar differences, we use the
Australian total assets for the fiscal year just prior to or on the
contract start date. We then take the two U.S. fiscal year-ends that
bracket the Australian fiscal year-end and average them and use this
to match with the exchange rate-adjusted Australian total assets.
After this matching process is completed, we then assess how
closely the firms matched in terms of size and start dates and find
that the differences are reasonably small. We started with 139
contracts by 94 Australian firms listed on the ASX 200, where we were
able to find a closely matching U.S. firm. This Australian sample of
contracts includes firms with more than one CEO contract across our
sample period. Specifically, we have one firm with five contracts, one
153. Frydman & Saks, supra note 116, at 1, 3, 17.
154. See, e.g., Gabaix & Landier, supra note 121, at 49. According to the authors, six-fold
increases in CEO pay in the United States from 1980-2003 can be correlated with identical
increases in market capitalization of large U.S. corporations during this period.
155. AGPC REMUNERATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 429.
156. Id. at xviii.
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firm with four contracts, three firms with three contracts, twenty-five
firms with two contracts, and sixty-one firms with a single CEO
employment contract. Most of these cases of multiple contracts involve
different CEOs. We report in Table 1 below, the means, medians, and
standard deviations for the Australian and U.S. firms' contract start
dates and their total assets.
Table 1: Asset Size and Contract Start Dates - Matches
Assessment
Austl. U.S. T-Stat. Austl. U.S. Wilcoxon Austl. U.S.
Mean Mean for Mean Med. Med. Z Value Std. Std.
Value Value Diff. Value Value Dev. Dev.
Asset Size 15,039 10,573 0.823 2,126 1,926 0.088 51,317 33,217
Contract
Start Oct. 25, Feb. 2, Mar. 16, June 15,
Date 2005 2005 2006 2005
Table 1 shows that the differences in the typical contract start
dates are quite small, with a mean difference of eight months.
Likewise, the difference in the mean and median size of Australian
and U.S. firms measured by total assets is also small. A standard t
test for the difference in mean size of assets is insignificant, as is a
Wilcoxon test for the difference in median asset size. We interpret
these findings as evidence that we have achieved a good match
between our contracts.
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
A. Univariate Analysis of Major Contract Features of
Australian and U.S. Corporations
We break our descriptive analysis into three major tables that
summarize key features of the CEO employment contracts. 157 Table 2
covers major direct CEO compensation elements. Table 3 covers
157. Another interesting difference that is not shown in these tables is that all Australian
CEOs have written contracts, according to one distinguished Australian lawyer who handles
executive employment arrangements at many public companies. Interview with Attorney 1, at 1-
2 (on file with authors) [hereinafter Attorney 1 Interview]. By comparison, earlier work has
found that in the United States less than one-half of CEOs in the S&P 500 as of 2000 had
written employment contracts. Gillan et al., supra note 129, at 1629; see also Schwab & Thomas,
supra note 128, at 241 (finding that one-third of CEOs surveyed did not have employment
contracts).
HeinOnline  -- 64 Vand. L. Rev. 593 2011
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
deferred compensation features and contract length. And Table 4
reports on a number of other contract features such as non-compete
clauses.
In Table 2, we present data on starting salaries in U.S. dollars
("US $"), while almost all the other compensation variables are
presented in frequencies as to whether they are mentioned in the
employment contract or contract summary. The data are presented in
this manner because many of the contracts only specify dollar
amounts for the initial salary level with all other compensation
parameters being determined in the United States by each company's
Compensation Committee, or in Australia, by the firm's Remuneration
Committee, or in some cases by the full board of directors.
Table 2: CEO Compensation Features: Base Salary and Frequency
of Other Features
Salary Bonus LT Vesting Perfori. No. of Rest. Stock
(U.S. $) Plan Incent. Period Hurdles Hurdles Stock Opts.
(%) Plan (Years) (%) per (M) (%)
(%) Contr.
Austl. Mean (%) 95 69 3.09 97 1.39 12 38
885,253
Median 723,840 3.00 1.00
(%)
U.S. Mean (%) 693,497 95 50 2.46 42 0.49 55 77
Median 700,000 3.00 0.00
(%)
Diff. Mean (%) 191,756 0 19 0.63 55 0.90 -43 -39
T Stat. 2.30 0.26 3.11 3.17 10.48 8.43 -8.36 -6.95
Diff. Median 23,840 0.00 1.00
(%)
Wilcoxon 2.03 2.43 7.83
Z Value
The data reveal a number of interesting variations between the
two countries. First, for our matched firms, the Australian CEOs are
paid greater amounts of base salary than American CEOs even after
converting the Australian currency into U.S. dollars and excluding the
cash equivalent value of Australian perquisites. Furthermore, the
mean and median differences are statistically significant. The
American contracts are significantly more likely to include various
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forms of equity-based compensation, specifically restricted stock, and
stock options, compared to Australian contracts. However, the mean
and median vesting periods for restricted stock and options, when they
are present in a contract, are significantly longer for Australian firms.
Both groups of firms are equally likely to have contracts that include
annual bonuses, and these are extremely common in both countries
(ninety-five percent of both samples). Another very important
difference in these contracts is that almost all the Australian contracts
that employ restricted stock or stock options are contingent on
meeting one, two, or as many as three performance hurdles before the
stock or option compensation can be paid. In contrast, less than half
the CEO contracts of U.S. firms have any performance hurdles,
though this percentage is rising over time. These performance hurdles
are in addition to the requirement of retaining the CEO position,
which is generally the only requirement that needs to be met in a
majority of U.S. contracts. These stark differences are likely due to the
greater level of institutional investor-concentrated stock ownership in
Australia than the United States.
It might at first appear surprising to see higher base salary
figures for the Australian firms. Features of both the Australian and
U.S. regulatory environments would seem to be relevant in explaining
this somewhat unusual fact. In several interviews with Australian
corporate governance participants conducted by one of us we inquired
about possible explanations for this difference. One corporate attorney
explained that in Australia, perquisites were generally rolled into
salary, instead of being separately listed in the contract, because of
the higher fringe benefit tax rates that applied to perquisites under
Australian tax law. 158 Australian contracts also allow the CEOs to
allocate some of their fixed compensation to superannuation or non-
cash components such as a car. 159 However, we have extracted the
value of these payments from CEOs' cash compensation figures. 160 By
comparison, in the United States, a major regulatory factor explaining
the relatively low base pay in U.S. companies is taxation. In the mid-
1990s, the United States introduced an important tax provision, IRC
158. Attorney 1 Interview, supra note 157, at 10-11.
159. This allocation is disclosed in the Remuneration Report contained in the Directors'
report to the company's shareholders. There are publicly available sources of this information
which do not relate to any of our contracts or the firms that provided them. For instance, a
search for a random ASX 200 firm yielded a copy of Quantas Airlines 2009 Directors' Report that
showed on page 74 that the Company's CEO had allocated his fixed annual remuneration to
several categories of short-term employee benefits.
160. We used the Remuneration Reports contained in each sample company's securities
filings to calculate these values.
595
HeinOnline  -- 64 Vand. L. Rev. 595 2011
596 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:2:559
section 162(m), disallowing corporate tax deductions for remuneration
exceeding $1 million per annum, unless it is performance-based. 1 1 So
it appears that legal differences may largely explain some of these
basic variations in employment contract terms across the Australian
and U.S. landscapes.
Table 3 examines contract length, deferred compensation, and
change-in-control features of these contracts. The contract length
variable is in years, while all of the other variables are in frequencies.
Again we use frequencies because calculating the dollar values for the
deferred compensation variables requires examining other data
sources besides the contracts themselves.
Table 3: Contract Length and Frequencies of Deferred
Compensation Features
Length Pension Profit SERP Change in Gross-Up
(Years) Sharing Control
Austi. Mean (%) 2.32 72 6 6 31 24
Median 1.00
(%)
U.S. Mean (%) 2.87 31 18 31 82 41
Median 3.00(%)
Diff. Mean (%) -0.55 41 -12 -25 -51 -17
T- Stat. -2.868 6.606 -2.157 -4.219 -7.460 -1.928
Diff. Median -2.00
(%)
Wilcoxon -3.028
Z Value
161. I.R.C. §162(m) (1995); see also Walter T. Henderson, Executive Compensation: New
Section 162(m) Limits Excessive Remuneration, 21 J. CORP. TAX'N 195 (1994) (explaining section
162(m) caps on remuneration); Joshua A- Kreinberg, Note, Reaching Beyond Performance
Compensation in Attempts to Own the Corporate Executive, 45 DUKE L.J. 138, 156-57 (1995)
(describing congressional action on performance-based pay); Conway, supra note 90, at 396
(discussing the history of section 162(m)); Miske, supra note 90, at 1684-93 (examining section
162(m) in detail).
Although it appears that Congress's intent in enacting this provision was "to rein in
excessive executive compensation," Conway, supra note 90, at 384, the outcome of the legislation
was quite different. Rather than reducing executive pay in the U.S., section 162(m) merely led to
the restructuring of remuneration packages to include a far greater proportion of compensation
in the form of stock options. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of
Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1817 (2007) (discussing the potential gap between motivation
and outcome in regulatory reform).
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In Table 3, we see a number of very interesting differences in
the contract features. U.S. contracts are notably longer than the
Australian contracts, with the median length of an Australian
contract being one year, while in the United States it is three years.
U.S. contracts are significantly more likely to include participation in
profit-sharing plans as well as SERPs. American CEO employment
contracts are also significantly more likely to contain change-in-
control protections and a tax gross-up provision to cover the tax
liabilities associated with the change-in-control payment. The data
show that change-in-control provisions are about three times as
frequent and tax gross-up provisions are nearly fifty percent more
frequent in U.S. contracts. By contrast, Australian CEO employment
contracts are more than twice as likely to discuss the CEO's pension
funding. All of these differences in frequencies are statistically
significant. In some instances, there are underlying legal rules that
may explain several of these differences. The higher prevalence of
pension plans in Australia likely reflects the mandatory nature of
company contributions to superannuation plans that would be
mentioned in most Australian contracts. 162  Furthermore, the
Australian corporation code and ASX listing rules may explain the
relatively low incidence of change-in-control provisions. Under section
200B of the Corporations Act, shareholder approval is required if a
company pays its CEO or other directors more than a specified
threshold level of benefits or remuneration in connection with their
leaving office. Prior to 2009, the threshold level was "seven times the
average annual [remuneration] . . . over the preceding three year
periods."163 However, this portion of the Corporations Act was
amended to apply to all contracts introduced or amended after
November 23, 2009. The new code provision requires shareholder
approval of all termination payments above one year's base salary for
all key management personnel. Furthermore, ASX listing Rule 10.18
"[p]rohibits a senior executive [from] receiving a termination payment
due to a change in the control of the company."'164 Given these rather
stringent rules, it is not surprising that we see fewer change-in-control
provisions in the Australian contracts. 165 The fact that we observe any
162. Attorney 1 Interview, supra note 157, at 13.
163. Sheehan & Fenwick, supra note 112, at 212.
164. AGPC REMUNERATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 132.
165. In practice, Australian lawyers put "material diminution" clauses into the termination
provisions of the CEO's contract to take the place of change-in-control provisions. These clauses
specify that the CEO's loss of management authority constitutes a termination without cause,
and, when combined with other commonly included actions that also trigger a termination
without cause, they provide the same protections as change-in-control provisions.
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change-in-control provisions whatsoever in the Australian contracts is
a tribute to skillful drafting around the rule.
Table 4 presents summary information on other important
features of our employment contract sample. The table includes data
on Do-Not-Compete ("DNC") clauses, mandatory arbitration
provisions, and several important restrictions on CEOs regarding the
sale, contingent sale, or hedging of stock or stock options. All of these
variables are measured by the frequency with which they appear in
the contracts.
Table 4: Frequencies of Other Important Contract Features
DNC Arbitration Stock Hedge Stock Stock Sale Other
Constraints Pledge Constraints Restraints
Limits
Austl. Mean (%) 69 2 21 2 2 7
U.S. Mean (%) 85 47 2 3 2 4
Diff. Mean (%) -16 -45 19 -1 0 3
T-Stat. -2.666 -9.617 2.256 0.589 0.269 0.811
Table 4 shows that DNC clauses appear frequently in both
Australian and U.S. contracts, although U.S. contracts are
significantly more likely to have such clauses than the Australian
agreements. Arbitration clauses are also quite common in U.S.
contracts, but are nearly non-existent in Australian contracts.
Hedging, pledging, sale, and other restrictions on the sale of restricted
stock and stock options are not popular in either country, although
constraints on hedging stock are significantly more common in
Australian contracts, occurring in roughly twenty-one percent of
Australian CEO contracts. However, the differences in stock selling
and pledging clauses across Australia and the United States are not
statistically significant. Overall, the Australian contracts appear to
reflect greater shareholder concern and a determination to restrain a
CEO's desire to hedge the risk associated with stock-based
compensation, possibly because shareholders have stronger rights in
Australia and more concentrated institutional ownership.
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Hedging provisions are likely to become much more common in
Australia because of recent regulatory developments. Principle 8 of
the revised ASX corporation governance principles 166 alludes to such
practices indirectly in the context of disclosure, asserting that the
corporate governance statement of a listed company's annual report
should include a summary of the firm's policy on prohibiting entry into
transactions that "limit the economic risk of participating in unvested
entitlements under any equity-based remuneration schemes."'167 The
Productivity Commission has recently recommended that companies
should be required to prohibit their executives from hedging unvested
equity remuneration or vested equity subject to holding locks.168 In its
response to the Productivity Commission report, the Australian
Government recognised that hedging was a mechanism designed to
"de-link" remuneration from corporate performance. 169  The
government agreed with the proposal to prohibit executives from
engaging in such practices, but considered that the scope of such a
prohibition should be expanded. 170
Australian corporate lawyers interviewed by one of us offered
the following insights into why some of these contract differences
exist. When asked about the absence of arbitration provisions, one
well-known Australian corporate lawyer explained: "[W]e have a very
strong labor union movement history here and arbitration has
industrial connotations .... [G]entlemen wouldn't engage in that sort
of business basically. It's just not considered desirable." 171 A second
experienced attorney, however, was considerably less emphatic when
asked if CEO employment contracts ever contained an arbitration
provision, saying: "Yes, [but they're] not all that common. But there is
a reasonable incidence of it where there is a dispute, it will be subject
to arbitration .. . ."172 A third potential explanation offered by
commentators on this Article was more straightforward: arbitration is
viewed as costly and cumbersome, and a poor alternative to using the
regular litigation system.1 73 It is difficult to know which one of these
166. See ASX CGC 2007, supra note 21.
167. ASX CGC 2007, supra note 21, at 37.
168. REMUNERATION REPORT, supra note 13, recommendation 5, at 371.
169. AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION'S INQUIRY ON
EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION IN AUSTRALIA 10 (2010).
170. Id.
171. Attorney 1 Interview, supra note 157, at 8.
172. Interview with Attorney 2, at 18 (on file with authors).
173. Audience Comments to Article Draft, University of Sydney Law School Workshop (June
28, 2010).
599
HeinOnline  -- 64 Vand. L. Rev. 599 2011
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
explanations to accept, or whether perhaps all three have some
validity.
B. Regression Analysis
While we have found some notable differences in the typical
contract features found in Australian and U.S. matched firms, this
could easily be due to differences in other firm, CEO, and contract
characteristics of the two samples. Thus, to further refine our
analysis, we move beyond mean and median differences in contract
characteristics to multivariate ordinary least squares ("OLS")
regressions where we can control for a number of key CEO
employment contract features in our matched sample of Australian
and U.S. contracts. In addition to the key explanatory variable, an
Australian firm indicator, we use as explanatory variables the log of
total assets and its squared value to further control for firm size
differences, prior return standard deviation to control for firm risk
borne by senior managers, CEO tenure to partially control for
potential CEO influence on compensation, an indicator of a newly
appointed CEO to control for more potential CEO negotiating power,
and prior ROA to take account of prior CEO performance. 174
Following the model employed by existing literature, we begin
our analysis of these CEO contracts by focusing on CEO base salary.
The key question is whether the existing differences in salaries have a
national component or whether differences in salaries are explained
by other differences in firm, CEO, and contract characteristics.
Differences in CEO salary across the two countries could be due to
systematic differences in corporate governance, share ownership
patterns, corporation and securities laws, tax codes, accounting
methods, or other differences across countries. Since Australian
disclosures often include the cash value of contractually obligated
perquisites as part of cash compensation, we took particular care to
exclude these non-salary figures to avoid an upward bias in the
Australian salary figures.
Table 5 summarizes the results of our regression analysis of
the log of CEO salary. We take the logs of salary to partially overcome
the severe asymmetry in salary levels across firms, which in part
reflects a more severe asymmetry in the distribution of firm size.
Given that the dependent variable is bounded below by zero, the
estimation is based on a Tobit regression specification. Qualitatively
174. We also examined the usefulness of several other firm characteristics, such as market-
to-book ratio and leverage, but found that they had no statistical significance.
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similar results are obtained when we use an OLS regression
specification.
Our key finding is that on average Australian firms pay higher
fixed salaries than U.S. firms, even after controlling for a wide array
of differences in firm characteristics including firm size, its squared
value, U.S. CEOs, U.S. cross-listed firms, market to book ratio,
leverage, CEO tenure, new CEOs, stock return volatility, and prior
firm performance, measured by ROA. Of these control variables, we
find that CEO tenure is positively related to CEO salaries. We also
find that firm size and prior firm performance have significant
positive effects on CEO salary, which is consistent with the existing
literature. Interestingly, we find strong evidence that the positive firm
size effect on CEO cash compensation is diminishing as firm size
increases (indicated by a negative firm size squared effect). The
remaining control variables have statistically insignificant effects on
CEO salary.
Table 5: Tobit Regressions of log CEO Salary
Variable Estimate T-value Estimate T-value Estimate T-value
(1) (2) (3)
Austl. Firm 0.130 2.28 0.150 2.29 0.126 2.06
U.S. CEO 0.004 0.04 0.098 1.05
U.S. Listed -0.264 -1.95 -0.253 -1.88
CEO Tenure 0.009 0.92 0.011 1.10 0.029 2.39
New CEO 0.203 2.42
Log Firm 0.490 5.81 0.458 5.33 0.425 5.86
Size
Log Firm -0.018 -3.59 -0.016 -3.14 -0.014 -3.15
Size*2
Std. 0.016 0.41 0.002 0.04
Deviation
ROA 0.743 2.49 0.806 2.70 0.565 2.23
Intercept 10.620 26.37 10.759 25.89 10.762 37.23
Pseudo R2 = .40 Pseudo R2= .42 Pseudo R2 = .44
N = 220 N = 193 N = 207
The dependent variable is the log of CEO annual cash salary.
The sample includes both Australian and U.S. observations where the
Australian contract can be matched with a similar U.S. CEO contract
in terms of the firm's industry, asset size, and contract start date. The
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sample period for contract start dates is 1998-2008. The variable
definitions are found in the appendix.
In the second regression, we add indicators for Australian
firms that have U.S. CEOs and stock that is cross-listed in the U.S.
The cross-listing indicator has a significant negative effect on CEO
base salary, while the indicator for U.S. CEOs has a statistically
insignificant positive effect. One possible reason for the insignificance
of these two indicators is that all the U.S. firm observations are zero
by definition. In the third regression, we add an indicator for new
CEOs and find that the new CEO indicator is very significant and that
CEO tenure becomes more significant, while the Australian indicator
weakens somewhat but remains statistically significant. In summary,
the regression evidence shows that Australian firms tend to pay their
CEOs higher base salaries than U.S. firms, even after controlling for a
number of differences in firm characteristics found in the prior
literature to affect CEO compensation. Thus, our earlier matched
sample univariate analysis is further borne out in the regression
analysis. We also tried using the market to book ratio, the debt to
total asset ratio, and standard deviation of prior stock returns as
additional independent control variables, but they were statistically
insignificant.
Given the importance of the question of whether Australian
CEO compensation is affected by international labor market
competition, we re-estimate our prior regressions of the log of CEO
salary using a subsample of only Australian CEO employment
contracts. We estimate the model on this restricted sample since, as
noted above, by definition CEOs in U.S. firms have zero values for the
U.S. CEO and U.S. cross-listed indicators. Again, we use a Tobit
regression given that the dependent variable is bounded below by
zero.
In other results, not displayed in a table, we observe several
interesting findings. First, Australian firms that cross-list their shares
in the United States have significantly lower salaries, consistent with
the pattern we observe for U.S. firm CEO salaries. Second, we find an
insignificant effect on salary when an Australian firm employs a U.S.
CEO. This result is surprising, but it may reflect at least two
possibilities. First, we may simply have too few observations where
the Australian firm has hired a U.S. national to be CEO. Second, it
may be that the U.S. national has been working in Australia so long
that he or she no longer views the U.S. labor market as a good
alternative because of the strong personal, business, and financial ties
that the CEO has developed in Australia. We hope to explore this
result in future research.
602 [Vol. 64:2:559
HeinOnline  -- 64 Vand. L. Rev. 602 2011
2011] CEO EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT PROVISIONS
We next examine the frequency of other important components
of compensation to assess how similar or different these elements are
in Australia and the United States. We start by examining the
frequency with which CEO employment contracts include restricted
stock and stock options in the next two tables. Table 6 presents
estimates of the likelihood that a firm includes restricted stock in its
CEO compensation package, using a probit regression specification
since the dependent variable is binary. The estimates show that
restricted stock is much less common in Australian firms' CEO
employment contracts than in U.S. firms' CEO contracts, after
controlling for other important differences in CEO and firm
characteristics used in the prior table. The coefficient on the
Australian firm indicator is large in both economic magnitude and
statistical significance.
Table 6: Probit Regressions of the Likelihood of Restricted Stock in
Australian and U.S. CEO Employment Contracts
Variable Estimate Wald Estimate Wald Estimate Wald
Chi Sq. Chi Sq. _ Chi Sq.
(1) (2) (3)
Austl. Firm -1.334 38.16 -1.586 31.60 -1.664 35.54
U.S. CEO -0.272 0.33 -0.236 0.24
U.S. Listed 1.398 8.56 1.476 9.22
CEO Tenure -0.020 0.32 -0.013 0.13 0.062 2.14
New CEO 0.648 3.62
Log Firm Size 0.508 1.99 0.740 3.53 0.721 3.74
Log Firm Size*2 -0.015 0.48 -0.029 1.61 -0.028 1.60
Std. Deviation 0.150 1.09 0.111 0.50
ROA 0.374 0.16 0.188 0.04 0.201 0.05
Intercept -3.185 3.60 -3.964 4.64 -4.223 7.29
Pseudo R2 = .26 Pseudo R1= .30 Pseudo R2 = .32
N = 226 N = 199 N = 215
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The dependent variable is an indicator that takes a value of
one when the contract specifies restricted stock and is zero otherwise.
The sample includes both Australian and U.S. observations where the
Australian contract can be matched with a similar U.S. CEO contract
in terms of the firm's industry, asset size, and contract start date. The
sample period for contract start dates is 1998-2008. The variable
definitions are found in the appendix.
In examining these control variables, we find that larger firm
size increases the likelihood that CEOs will be awarded restricted
stock, but at a diminishing rate, as indicated by the negative
coefficient on firm size squared. In the second regression, we see that
Australian firms with a U.S. listing are more likely to use restricted
stock than other Australian firms, which appears to reflect the
influence of U.S. executive compensation patterns, possibly due in
part to the firms having major U.S. operations, stockholders, or
customers. In the third regression model, we find that restricted stock
is more likely to be paid to new CEOs and to CEOs with longer tenure.
The remaining control variables, including prior firm performance, are
not significantly related to the likelihood of restricted stock.
In Table 7, we estimate the likelihood of stock option grants
being in CEO employment contracts across major U.S. and Australian
firms. Once more, we use a probit regression model since the
dependent variable is again binary. In our earlier univariate matched-
pair comparisons, we find that Australian contracts were significantly
less likely to include stock options in CEO employment contracts. We
now revisit this issue where we control for other major CEO and firm
characteristics.
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Table 7: Probit Regressions of the Likelihood of Stock Options in
Australian and U.S. CEO Employment Contracts
Variable Estimate Wald Estimate Wald Estimate Wald
Chi Sq. Chi Sq. Chi Sq.
(1) (2) (3)
Austl. Firm -1.052 27.86 -1.262 28.37 -1.357 37.87
U.S. CEO 0.716 4.52 0.572 3.19
U.S. Listed 0.392 0.83 0.542 1.68
CEO Tenure 0.208 2.78 0.055 2.24 0.078 2.54
New CEO 0.223 0.54
Log Firm Size -0.172 0.36 -0.173 0.31 -0.122 0.23
Log Firm Size*2 0.005 0.09 0.004 0.04 -0.000 0.00
Std. Deviation 0.168 1.65 0.225 2.43
ROA 0.616 0.40 0.812 0.61 0.821 0.91
Intercept 1.222 0.82 1.181 0.65 1.306 1.77
R
2
= .19 R 2= .22 R2= .21
N = 226 N = 199 N = 215
The dependent variable is an indicator that takes a value of
one when the contract specifies stock option compensation and is zero
otherwise. The sample includes both Australian and U.S. observations
where the Australian contract can be matched with a similar U.S.
CEO contract in terms of the firm's industry, asset size, and contract
start date. The sample period for contract start dates is 1998-2008.
The variable definitions are found in the appendix.
Across all three of our probit regression specifications, we find
that CEOs in U.S. firms are more likely to have stock options as part
of their compensation. In model 1, we also find that stock options are
more likely as CEO tenure increases, which may be an effort on the
board's part to offset the increased risk aversion of a CEO who is
aging. We also see that stock options are more likely when the firm
has more volatile stock returns, which may be an effort to lower the
CEO's risk aversion in an otherwise very risky firm. In models 2 and
3, we find that CEOs of Australian firms who are U.S. citizens are
more likely to have stock option compensation, possibly because of
more intense labor market competition for these particular executives.
The remaining control variables, including the new CEO indicator,
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firm size, and prior firm performance, are not significant. An
important difference between typical U.S. and Australian employment
contracts, which is not captured by our statistical model, is that in
nearly all Australian contracts, restricted stock and stock options are
not paid unless the firm meets at least one performance hurdle, while
in the United States, performance hurdles are much less common. 175
The results of our comparison of U.S. and Australian contracts
offer some interesting contrasts with several earlier studies that
compare U.S. and U.K. CEO compensation. 176 In those prior studies,
the authors conclude that U.S. CEOs' compensation is significantly
higher than U.K. CEOs' compensation. What is interesting about our
initial results is that U.S. CEOs clearly do not have higher base
salaries in comparison to Australia. On the other hand, U.S. contracts
are much more likely to include restricted stock and stock option
features, which generally require payment after a CEO remains at the
firm a fixed number of years, typically without imposing any
performance requirements. Thus, it is unclear whether the total pay
package of Australian CEOs is higher than that of U.S. CEOs,
especially when we recognize that stock options can be out-of-the-
money when they expire, which we have frequently observed in recent
years. But what is clear is that U.S. CEOs have much stronger stock-
based compensation, while Australian firms have significantly less
frequent stock-based compensation. In addition, when stock-based pay
is included in Australian CEO pay packages, their compensation is
also conditional on meeting performance hurdles, which should
further motivate Australian CEOs to perform at a high level. This
performance hurdle is much less common in the United States, though
it appears to offer CEOs stronger incentives to perform well. We hope
in follow-up research to analyze whether U.S. compensation packages
on average are greater than their Australian counterparts and how
the structure of severance contracts, bonus plans, and restricted stock
and stock option plans differ between CEO employment contracts in
Australia and the United States.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we find a number of similarities between CEO
employment contracts in the United States and Australia. We also
175. Bettis et al., supra note 137, at 1.
176. Martin J. Conyon & Kevin J. Murphy, The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the
United States and United Kingdom, 110 ECON. J. F640 (2000); Martin J. Conyon et al., Are U.S.
CEOs Paid More Than U.K. CEOs? Inferences from Risk-Adjusted Pay (Apr. 6, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-907469.
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find some interesting differences in contract provisions, not only in
terms of compensation, but also with respect to other contract terms
such as contract length and restrictions on CEO actions that can be
viewed as more shareholder-friendly. Some of these differences, such
as the relative infrequency of change-in-control provisions in
Australian contracts, appear to be explained by clear differences in the
legal and regulatory environments. Other differences may reflect
substitution of one form of performance-based compensation for
another. However, there remain contract features, such as contract
length, that are not so easily explained in this way. In these cases, it is
interesting to speculate about whether other institutional differences
such as tax codes, takeover protections, institutional share ownership
levels, and the relative power of shareholders and boards in the two
countries can help explain these remaining contract differences.
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Appendix: Definitions of Variables
Salary
Bonus
Restricted stock
Stock options
LT performance incentives
CEO age
CEO tenure
New CEO indicator
Austl. indicator
Firm size
Stock volatility
Stock return performance
CEO start date
CEO base salary. Sources: U.S. - Execucomp, SEC filings,
employment contracts and DEF 14A, Austl. - Contract or
Contract Summary.
Accounting based cash bonus. Sources: U.S. - Execucomp,
SEC filings, employment contracts and DEF 14A, Austl. -
Contract or Contract Summary.
Stock grants that involve vesting made at the contract
start date. Sources: U.S. - Execucomp, SEC filings,
employment contracts and DEF 14A, Austl. - Contract or
Contract Summary.
Stock option grants that involve vesting made at the
contract start date. Sources: U.S. - Execucomp, SEC
filings, employment contracts and DEF 14A, Austl. -
Contract or Contract Summary.
Compensation plans based on LT stock and accounting
hurdles, where payment can be in cash, stock or options.
Sources: U.S. - Execucomp, SEC filings, employment
contracts and DEF 14A, Austl. - Contract or Contract
Summary.
Age at the contract start date. Sources: U.S. - Execucomp.
Austl. - Connect 4, OneSource, and a CEO's biographical
information in firm annual reports and CEO employment
contracts.
CEO initial contract start date minus the CEO current
contract start date. Sources: U.S. - CEO employment
contract, Austl. - employment contract and contract
summary.
CEO start date is less than 6 months before the contract
start.
Australian headquartered company listed on ASX 200.
Book value of assets at the fiscal year-end closest to the
Australian CEO contract start date and for the U.S.
matching firm the average of the two year-end figures
that bracket the Australian fiscal year-end.
Stock daily return standard deviation over the year prior
to the contract start date. Sources: U.S. returns - CRSP,
Austl. returns - Datastream.
One year cumulative return over the year prior to the
contract start date. Sources: U.S. returns - CRSP, Austl.
returns - Datastream.
CEO's Initial appointment date. Sources: U.S. -
Execucomp, Austl. - Fin Analysis database, Dat Analysis
database, as well as CEO employment contracts and their
summaries and news reports.
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